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NON ELEMENTARY PROPER FORCING
JAKOB KELLNER
Abstract. We introduce a simplified framework for ord-transitive models and Shelah’s
non elementary proper (nep) theory. We also introduce a new construction for the countable
support nep iteration.
Introduction
In this paper, we introduce a simplified, self contained framework for forcing with ord-
transitive models and for non elementary proper (nep) forcing, and we provide a new con-
struction for the countable support nep-iteration.
Judah and Shelah [IS88] introduced the notion “Suslin proper”: A forcing notion Q ⊆
ωω is Suslin proper if
• “p ∈ Q”, “q ≤ p” and “q ⊥ p” (i.e., p and q are incompatible) are all
˜
Σ11 statements
(in some real parameter r), and if
• for all contable transitive models M (of some ZFC∗, a sufficiently large fragment
of ZFC) that contain the parameter r and for all p ∈ QM := Q∩ M there is a q ≤ p
which is M-generic, i.e., forces that the generic filter G meets every maximal
antichain A ∈ M of QM .
We always assume that H(χ) satisfies ZFC∗ (for sufficiently large regular cardinals χ).
Then every Suslin proper forcing Q is proper. (Given an elementary submodel N of H(χ),
apply the Suslin proper property to the transitive collapse of N.) So Suslin proper is a
generalization of properness for nicely definable forcings.
Shelah [She04] introduced a generalization of Suslin proper which he called non ele-
mentary proper (nep). Actually, it is a generalization in two “dimensions”:
(a) We do not require “p ∈ Q” etc. to be defined by
˜
Σ11 statements, but rather by some
arbitrary formulas that happen to be sufficiently (upwards) absolute.
(b) We do not require M to be a transitive model, but rather a so-called ord-transitive
model (and we allow more general parameters r).
Why is (b) useful? To “approximate” a forcing notion Q by forcings QM ∈ M, it is
necessary that Q is the union of QM for all possible models M. (This is of course the
case if Q is Suslin proper: any p ∈ Q is a real, and therefore element of some countable
transitive M and thus of QM = Q ∩ M.) So if we allow only countable transitive models
M, we can only talk about forcings Q that are subsets of H(ℵ1). Of course there are many
other interesting forcing notions, such as iterations of length ≥ ω2, products of size ≥ ℵ2,
creature forcing constructions etc. Adopting ord-transitive models allows us to deal with
some of these forcings as well.
The motivation for (a) is straightforward: This way, we can include forcing notions that
are not Suslin proper (such as Sacks forcing), while we can still prove many of the results
that hold for Suslin forcing notions.
To summarize:
• Just as Suslin proper, nep has consequences that are not satisfied by all proper forc-
ing notions. So when we know that a forcing is nep and not just proper, we know
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more about its behavior. And while nep implies all of the useful consequences of
Suslin proper, nep is more general (i.e., weaker): Some popular forcings are nep,
but not Suslin proper (e.g., Sacks forcing).
For example, let us say that “Q preserves non-meager” if Q forces that the ground
model reals ar not meager (and analogously we define “Q preserves non-Lebesgue-
null). Goldstern and Shelah [She98, XVIII.3.11] proved that the proper count-
able support iteration (Pα, Qα) of non-meager preserving forcing notions preserves
non-meager, provided that all Qα are Suslin proper.
Shelah and the author [KS05, 9.4] proved that the same preservation theorem holds
for Lebesgue-null instead of meager and that it is sufficient to assume (nicely de-
finable) nep instead of Suslin proper. This has been applied by Roslanowski and
Shelah in [RS06], which proves that consistently every real function is continuous
on a set of positive outer Lebesgue measure. (The preservation theorem is applied
to a forcing that is nep but not Suslin proper.)
• In particular, forcings that are not subsets of H(ℵ1) can be nep; for example big
countable support products. In particular, we get a preservation theorem: under
suitable assumptions, the countable support iteration of nep forcings is nep.
An example of how this can be used is Lemma 4.24 of this paper. (This fact was
used in [SS07, 4.5] to investigate Abelian groups).
Note that the Ord-transitive models mentioned in (b) above can be useful in a different
(and simpler) setting as well: Instead of considering a forcing definition and the realizations
QV , QM of this definition (in V or a countable model M, respectively), we can just use two
arbitrary (and entirely different) forcings QV ∈ V and QM ∈ M and require that QM is
an M-complete subforcing of QV . In the transitive case this concept has been a central
ingredient of Shelah’s oracle-cc [She98, IV], and it can be applied to ord-transitive models
as well. An example for such an application is the paper [GKSW] by Goldstern, Shelah,
Wohofsky and the author, which proves the consistency of the Borel Conjecture plus the
dual Borel Conjecture. For this construction, nep forcing is not required, just ord-transitive
models. We very briefly comment on this in Section 1.3.
Contents.
Section 1, p. 2: We define ord-transitive ǫ-models M and their forcing extensions M[G].
Section 2, p. 8: We define the notion of non elementary proper forcing: Q is nep, if it
is nicely definable and there are generic conditions for all countable models. If
Q ⊆ 2ω, then it is enough to consider transitive models; otherwise models such
as in Section 1 are used.
Section 3, p. 13: We mention some examples. Rule of thumb: every nicely definable
forcing that can be shown to be proper is actually nep. We also give a very
partial counterexample to this rule of thumb.
Section 4, p. 22: We define (a simplified version of) the countable support iteration
of nep forcings (such that the limit is again nep).
Most of the notion and results in this paper are due to Shelah, and (most likely) can be
found in [She04], some of them explicitly (and sometimes in a more general setting), some
at least “in spirit”. However, the notation and many technical details are different: In many
cases the notation here is radically simplified, in other cases the notions are just incompa-
rable (for example the definition of nep-parameter). Most importantly, we work in standard
set theory, not in a set theory with ordinals as urelements. The result of Subsection 3.5 is
due to Zapletal.
1. Forcing with ord-transitive models
Whenever we use the notation N ≺ H(χ), we imply that N is countable, and that χ is a
sufficiently large regular cardinal. We write H(χ) for the sets that are hereditarily smaller
NON ELEMENTARY PROPER FORCING 3
than χ and Rα for the sets of rank less than α. (We will use the notation Vα for forcings
extension of Pα, the α-th stage of some forcing iteration.)
1.1. Ord-transitive models. Let M be a countable set such that (M, ∈) satisfies ZFC∗, a
subset of ZFC.1 We do not require M to be transitive or elementary. ON denotes the class
of ordinals. We use ONM to denote the set of x ∈ M such that M thinks that x ∈ ON;
similarly for other definable classes. This notation can formally be inconsistent with the
following notation (but as usual we assume that the reader knows which variant is used): 2
For a definable set such as ω1, we use ωM1 to denote the element x of M such that M thinks
that x satisfies the according definition.
Definition 1.1. • M is ord-absolute, if ωM = ω, ω ⊆ M, and ONM ⊆ ON (and
therefore ONM = M ∩ ON).
• M is ord-transitive, if it is ord-absolute and x ∈ M \ ON implies x ⊂ M.
An elementary submodel N ≺ H(χ) is not ord-transitive. The simplest example of an
ord-transitive model that is not transitive is the ord-collapse of an elementary submodel:
Definition 1.2. Define ord-colM : M → V as the transitive collapse of M fixing the ordi-
nals:
ord-colM(x) =

x if x ∈ ON
{ord-colM(t) : t ∈ x ∩ M} otherwise.
ord-col(M) ≔ {ord-colM(x) : x ∈ M}.
By induction one can easily show:
Fact 1.3. Assume that M is ord-absolute and set i ≔ ord-colM , M′ ≔ ord-col(M). Then
• i : M → M′ is an ∈-isomorphism.
• i(x) ∈ ON ↔ x ∈ ON. In particular, M ∩ ON = M′ ∩ ON.
• M′ is ord-transitive.
• i is the identity iff M is ord-transitive.
• The ord-collapse “commutes” with the transitive collapse, i.e., the transitive col-
lapse of the ord-collapse of M is the same as the transitive collapse of M.
So if N ≺ H(χ) and H(χ)  ZFC∗, then M = ord-col(N) is an ord-transitive model. This
example demonstrates that several simple formulas (that are absolute for transitive models),
such as “x ⊂ z”, “x∪y = z” and “x∩y = z”, are not absolute for the ord-transitive models.3
However, a few simple properties are absolute: In particular, if a formula ϕ(r) about real
numbers is absolute for all transitive models, then is absolute for all ord-transitive models
as well (which can easily be seen using the transitive collaps, cf. the following Fact 1.5).
We now mention some of these absolute properties for ord-transitive models M:
• x ∈ ωω is absolute; every Σ11 formula is absolute;
• “Finite sets” are absolute: z = {x, y} is absolute, if x ∈ M and x is finite, then
x ⊂ M and M  “x is finite”. HM(ℵ0) = H(ℵ0).
• If M  f : A → B, then f : A ∩ M → B ∩ M. If additionally M thinks that f is
injective (or surjective), then f is injective (or surjective with respect to the new
image).
• x ∈ Rα is upwards absolute. If additionally x < ON, then |x|≤|α| is upwards
absolute.
1We assume that ZFC∗ contains a sufficient part of ZFC, in particular extensionality, pairing, product, set-
difference, emptyset, infinity and the existence of ω1.
2If M is not transitive, then for example the set x = {α ∈ M : M  α ∈ ω1} will generally be different from
the element y ∈ M such that M  y =∈ ω1. In that case x < M.
3
“ϕ(x¯) is absolute” means M  ϕ(m¯) iff V  ϕ(m¯) for all m¯ from M. Let i be the ord-collapse from an
elementary submodel N to M. Set x = ω1, y = {{0}} and z = x ∪ y. Then x ∈ ON and z < ON, so i(x) = x and i(z)
is countable. Therefore i(x) ∪ i(y) , i(z), and i(x) * i(z). Also, i(z) ∩ i(x) , i(x).
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• If either x ∈ ON, or x ∩ ON = ∅, then y ⊂ x is absolute.
Instead of ord-transitive models, we could equivalently use transitive models with an
(ordinal) labeling on the ordinals:
Definition 1.4. A labeled model is a pair (M, f ) consisting of a transitive, countable ZFC∗
model M and a strictly monotonic function f : (M ∩ ON) → ON satisfying f (α) = α for
α ≤ ω.
Given a labeled model (M, f ), define a map i : M → V by
i(x) =

f (x) if x ∈ ON
{i(y) : y ∈ x} otherwise.
Set uncoll(M, f ) := i[M].
Given an ord-transitive model M, let j : M → M′ be the transitive collapse (an ∈-
isomorphism) and let f : M′ ∩ ON → ON be the inverse of j. Define labeledcoll(M) :=
(M′, f ).
By induction, one can prove the following:
Fact 1.5. If M is an ord-transitive model, then labeledcoll(M) is a labeled model and
uncoll(labeledcoll(M)) = M. If (M, f ) is a labeled model, then uncoll(M, f ) is an ord-
transitive model and labeledcoll(uncoll(M, f )) = (M, f ).
We say that the ord-transitive model M and the labeled model (M′, f ′) correspond to
each other, if M = uncoll(M′, f ′) or equivalently (M′, f ′) = labeledcoll(M). So each
ord-transitive model corresponds to exactly one labeled model and vice versa.
This also shows that is easy to create “weird” ord-transitive models; in particular “α
is successor ordinal” and similarly simple formulas are generally not absolute for ord-
transitive models. We will generally not be interested in such weird models:
Definition 1.6. Let M be ord-transitive.
• M is “successor-absolute”, if “α is successor” and “α = β + 1” both are absolute
between M and V .
• A successor-absolute M is cf ω-absolute, if “cf(α) = ω” and “A is a countable
cofinal subset of α” both are absolute between M and V .
Fact 1.7. If M is cf ω-absolute and M thinks that x is countable, then x ⊂ M.
Proof. If x < ON, then x ⊆ M. So assume towards a contradiction that x ∈ ON is minimal
with x 1 M (and x < ωM1 ). M thinks that y := x \ {0} (constructed in M) is countable and
cofinal in x. Since y < ON we know y ⊂ M, so x = ⋃α∈y α is a subset of M, since x was
the minimal counterexample.) 
M is successor-absolute iff the corresponding labeled model (M′, f ′) satisfies: f (α+1) =
f (α) + 1 and f (δ) is a limit ordinal for all limit ordinals δ.
Remark 1.8. • We will see in the next section how to construct forcing extensions
for ord-transitive models M, or equivalently labeled models (M′, f ′): If G is M-
generic, and G′ the image under the transitive collapse (which will be M′-generic),
then the forcing extension M[G] is just the ord-transitive model corresponding to
(M′[G′], f ′). Such forcing extensions are the most important “source” for ord-
transitive models that are not just (the ord-transitive collapse of) an elementary
model.
• In applications, we typically have to deal with ord-transitive models that are inter-
nal forcing extensions of elementary models (i.e., in the construction above G is
in V and M is the ord-collapse of N ≺ H(χ)).
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• All such ord-transitive models are ord-absolute (and satisfy many additional abso-
luteness properties). So for applications, it is enough to only consider ord-absolute
models, and restrictions of this kind sometimes make notation easier.
• Ord-collapses M of elementary submodels are cf ω-absolute. The same holds for
forcing extensions M[G] by proper forcing notions. However, general internal
forcing extensions M[G] will not be cf ω-absolute: If G is generic for a collapse
forcing, then M[G] will think that ωV1 is countable. In some applications (such
as the the preservation theorem mentioned in the introduction) it is essential to
use such collapses, therefore we cannot restrict ourselves to cf ω-absolute models.
However, for some other applications, cf ω-absolute models are sufficient (e.g.,
for the application mentioned in Section 1.3).
Every ord-transitive model is hereditarily countable modulo ordinals:
Definition 1.9. • We define ord-clos by induction: ord-clos(x) = x∪⋃{ord-clos(t) :
t ∈ x \ ON}.
• hco(α) = {x ∈ Rα : | ord-clos(x)|≤ ℵ0}
• hco = ⋃α∈ON hco(α).
For example, if α > ω1, then ω1 is element of hco(α), but ω1 ∪ {{∅}} or ω1 \ {∅} are not.
Facts 1.10. • ord-clos(M) is the smallest ord-transitive superset of M.
• A ZFC∗-model M is ord-transitive iff ord-clos(M) = M.
• If M is ord-transitive and countable, then M ∈ hco.
• If M is ord-transitive and x ∈ M, then ord-clos(x) = ord-closM(x) ⊆ M.
• “x ∈ hco(α)” is upwards absolute for ord-transitive models.
As already mentioned, there is an ord-transitive model M such that ωV1 is countable in
M. So M thinks that ωV1 is not just element of hco (which is true in V as well), but that it
can also be constructed as countable set (which is false in V).
1.2. Forcing extensions. Forcing still works for ord-transitive models (but the evaluation
of names has to be modified in the natural way). In the following, M always denotes an
ord-transitive model.
Definition 1.11. Let M think that ≤ is a partial order on P. So in V , ≤ is a partial order on
P∩ M. Then G is called P-generic over M (or just M-generic, or P-generic), if G ∩ P∩ M
is a filter on P ∩ M and meets every dense subset D ∈ M of P.4
To simplify notation, we will use the following assumption:
Assumption 1.12. P ∩ ON is empty. (Then in particular P ⊆ M, and we can write P
instead of P ∩ M. Also, if D ⊂ P is in M, then D ⊂ M.)
In Definition 1.11 we do not assume G ⊆ P. This slightly simplifies notation later on.
Obviously G is M-generic iff G ∩ P is M-generic. One could equivalently use maximal
antichains, predense sets, or open dense sets instead of dense sets in the definition (and one
can omit the “filter” part if one requires that a maximal antichain A in M meets the filter G
in exactly one point).
Let labeledcoll(M) = (M′, f ′) be the labeled model corresponding to M, via the transi-
tive collapse j. Let G ⊆ P and set P′ := j(P) and G′ := j[G]. Since the transitive collapse
is an isomorphism, G′ is P′-generic over M′ iff G is P-generic over M. In that case we can
form the forcing extension M′[G′] in the usual way, and define M[G] = uncoll(M′[G′], f ′)
as the ord-transitive model corresponding to (M′[G′], f ′). Let J : M[G] → M′[G′] be the
transitive collapse, and I its inverse, then we can define
˜
τ[G]M as I(J(
˜
τ)[G′]) for a P-name
˜
τ in M. Elementarity shows that this is a “reasonable” forcing extension.
4I.e.: If p, q ∈ G ∩ P∩ M, then there is a r ≤ p, q in G ∩ P∩ M; and if D ∈ M and M thinks that D is a dense
subset of P (or equivalently: D ∩ M is a dense subset of P ∩ M) then G ∩ D ∩ M is nonempty.
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We now describe this extension in more detail and using the ord-transitive model M
more directly:
Basic forcing theory shows: If M is a transitive model, P ∈ M, and G a P-generic filter
over M, then we can define the evaluation of names by
(1.1)
˜
τ[G] = {
˜
σ[G] : (
˜
σ, p) ∈
˜
τ, p ∈ G},
and M[G] will be a (transitive) forcing extension of M.
This evaluation of names works for elementary submodels as well, provided that G is
not only N-, but also V-generic. More exactly: If N ≺ H(χ) contains P, and if G is N- and
V-generic, then N[G] is a forcing extension of N (and in particular end-extension). Here
it is essential that G is V-generic as well: If N ≺ H(χ) and G ∈ V is N-generic (for any
nontrivial forcing P), then N[G] is not an end-extension of N, since G ∈ P(P) ∈ N, but
G < N.
This can be summarized as follows:
Fact 1.13. Assume that either M is transitive and G is M-generic, or that M ≺ H(χ) and
G is M- and V-generic. Then
• M[G] ⊃ M is an end-extension5 (i.e., if y ∈ M[G] and y ∈ x ∈ M, then y ∈ M),
and ONM[G] = ONM .
• M[G]  ϕ(
˜
τ[G]) iff M  p  ϕ(
˜
τ) for some p ∈ G.
In the transitive case M[G] is transitive; and in the elementary submodel case, we get:
• (M[G], ǫ, M) ≺ (HV[G](χ), ǫ, HV(χ)).
• Forcing extension commutes with transitive collapse: Let i be the transitive col-
lapse of M, and I of M[G]. Then I extends i, i[G] is i[M] -generic and i(
˜
τ)[i[G]] =
I(
˜
τ[G]).
If one considers general ord-transitive candidates M (i.e., M is neither transitive nor an
elementary submodel), then Definition (1.1) does not work any more. For example, if M is
countable and thinks that
˜
τ is a standard name for the ordinal ωV1 , then
˜
τ ⊂ M is countable,
so
˜
τ[G] will always be countable and different from ωV1 . This leads to the following natural
modification of (1.1):
Definition 1.14. Let G be P-generic over M, and let M think that
˜
τ is a P-name.
˜
τ[G]M ≔

x, if x ∈ M & (∃p ∈ G ∩ P) M  “p 
˜
τ = xˇ”
{
˜
σ[G]M : (∃p ∈ G ∩ P) (
˜
σ, p) ∈
˜
τ ∩ M} otherwise.
M[G] ≔ {
˜
τ[G]M :
˜
τ ∈ M, M  “
˜
τ is a P-name”}.
(Note that being a P-name is absolute.)
We usually just write
˜
τ[G] instead of
˜
τ[G]M. There should be no confusion which notion
of evaluation we mean, 1.14 or (1.1), which we can also write as
˜
τ[G]V :
• If M is transitive, then
˜
τ[G]M =
˜
τ[G]V .
• If M is elementary submodel (and G is M- and V-generic), then we use
˜
τ[G]V .
(
˜
τ[G]M does not lead to a meaningful forcing extensions.)6
• If M is ord-transitive, then we use
˜
τ[G]M.
5Any usual concept of forcing extension (with regard to pairs of ∈-models) will require that M[G] is an end-
extension of M: If
˜
τ is forced to be in some x with x ∈ V , then the value of
˜
τ can be decided by a dense set.
Similarly, we get: M is M[G] intersected with the transitive closure of M.
6If M is not ord-transitive, e.g., M ≺ H(χ), then
˜
τ[G]M does not lead to a meaningful forcing extension: Let
P be the countable partial functions from ω1 to ω1, and let G be M-generic (G can additionally be V-generic as
well). Let
˜
Γ ∈ M be the canonical name for the generic filter G. So
˜
Γ[G]M is countable. Since P is σ-closed,
˜
Γ[G]M ∈ PV (P) ∈ M, so M[G] (using the modified evaluation) is not an end-extension of V .
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Remark 1.15. The omission of M in
˜
τ[G]M should not hide the fact that for ord-transitive
models,
˜
τ[G]M trivially does depend on M: If for example M1 ∩ β = α < β and M1 thinks
that
˜
τ is a standard name for β, and if M2 contains P,
˜
τ and α, then then
˜
τ[G]M1 = β ,
˜
τ[G]M2 .
˜
τ[G] is well-defined only if G is M-generic, or at least a filter. (If G contains p0 ⊥P p1,
then there is (in M) a name
˜
τ and x0 , x1 such that pi forces
˜
τ = xi for i ∈ {0, 1}.)
If M is ord-transitive then the basic forcing theorem works as usual (using the modified
evaluation):
Theorem 1.16. Assume that M is ord-transitive and that G is M-generic. Then
• M[G] is ord-transitive.
• M[G] ⊃ M is an end-extension. ONM[G] = ONM .
• M[G]  ϕ(
˜
τ[G]) iff M  p  ϕ(
˜
τ) for some p ∈ G ∩ P.
Moreover, the transitive collapse commutes with the forcing extension: Let (M′, f ′) cor-
respond to M, and G′ the image of G under the transitive collapse. Then (M′[G′], f ′)
corresponds to M[G].
(The proof is a straightforward induction.) So forcing extensions of ord-transitive mod-
els behave just like the usual extensions. For example, we immediately get:
Corollary 1.17. If M is countable and ord-transitive, then M  “p  ϕ(
˜
τ)” iff M[G] 
ϕ(
˜
τ[G]) for every M-generic filter G (in V) containing p.
Fact 1.18. Assume that N is ord-transitive, M ∈ N, P ∈ M. Then the following are
absolute between N and V (for G ∈ N and
˜
τ ∈ M):
• M is ord-transitive.
• G is M-generic, and
• (assuming M is ord-transitive and G is M-generic)
˜
τ[G]M.
The last item means that we get the same value for
˜
τ[G]M whether we calculate it in N
or V . It does not mean
˜
τ[G]M =
˜
τ[G]N . (If
˜
τ is in M, then
˜
τ[G]N will generally not be an
interesting or meaningful object.)
Let us come back once more to the proper case. By induction on the rank of the names
we get that the ord-collapse and forcing extension commute:
Lemma 1.19. Assume that N ≺ H(χ), and P ∈ N. Let i : N → M be the ord-collapse.
• G ⊆ P is N-generic iff i[G] is M-generic.
• Assume that G is N- and V-generic. Then the ord-collapse I of N[G] extends i,
and I(
˜
τ[G]) = (i(
˜
τ))[i[G]].
• If P ⊆ hco, then i is the identity on P.
1.3. M-complete subforcings. In the rest of the paper, we will use ord-transitive models
in the context of definable proper forcings (similar to Suslin proper). But first let us briefly
describe another, simpler, setting in which ord-transitive models can be used.
Let M be a countable transitive model and QM a forcing notion in M. We say that QM
is an M-complete subforcing of Q ∈ V , if QM is a subforcing of Q and every maximal
antichain A ∈ M of QM is a maximal antichain in Q as well. So there are two differences
to the “proper” setting: QM and Q do not have to be defined by the same formula,7 and we
do not just require that below every condition in QM we find a QM-generic condition in Q,
but that already the empty condition is QM-generic.8
For transitive models, this concept has been used for a long time. It is, e.g., central
to Shelah’s oracle-cc [She98, IV]. In oracle-cc forcing, one typically constructs a forcing
7They do not have to be nicely definable at all, and furthermore QM and Q can be entirely different: E.g., QM
could be Cohen forcing in M and Q could be (equivalent to) random forcing in V .
8In the proper case, this is equivalent to “Q is ccc”.
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notion Q of size ℵ1 as follows: Construct (by induction on α ∈ ω1) an increasing (non-
continuous) sequence of countable transitive models Mα (we can assume that Mα knows
that α is countable), and forcing notions Qα ∈ Mα such that Qδ = ⋃β<δ Qβ for limits δ and
such that Qβ+1 is an Mβ-complete superforcing of Qβ. (Then each Qα will be Mα-complete
subforcing of the final Q.) So we use the pair (Mα, Qα) as an approximation to the final
forcing notion Q. Since we use transitive models, this Q has to be subset of H(ℵ1).
If we want to investigate other forcings, we can try to use ord-transitive models instead.
For example, in [GKSW] we use a forcing iteration ¯P = (Pα, Qα)α≤ω2 (where each Qα
consists of conditions in H(ℵ1)), and we “approximate” ¯P by pairs (Mx, ¯Px), where Mx
is a countable ord-transitive model and Mx thinks that ¯Px is a forcing iteration of length
ωV2 . Instead of assuming that P
x
ω2
is a subforcing of Pω2 , it is more natural to assume
(inductively) that each Pxα can be canonically (and in particular Mx-completely) embedded
into Pα, and that Pα forces that Qxα[Gxα] (evaluated by the induced Pxα-generic filter [Gxα]) is
an Mx[Gxα]-complete subforcing of Qα. We show that given ¯Px in a countable ord-transitive
model Mx we can find variants of the finite suppost and the countable support iterations ¯P
such that ¯Px canonically embeds into ¯P (and we show that some preservation theorems that
are known for proper countable support iterations also hold for this variant of countable
support). For this application it is enough to consider cf ω-absolute models.
In the current paper, we do something very similar (in the nep setting, i.e., the defin-
able/proper framework), in Sections 4.1 and 4.3. Let us again stress the obvious difference:
In the nep case, we use definable forcings, and Qxα is the evaluation in Mx[Gxα] of the same
formula that defines Qα in V[Gα], and we just get that below (the canonical image of) each
p ∈ Pxα there is some Mx-generic q ∈ Pα.
In particular, the application of non-wellfounded models in [GKSW] does not use any
of the concepts that are introduced in the rest of this paper.
2. Nep forcing
2.1. Candidates. We now turn our attention to definable forcings. More particularly, we
will require that for all suitable (ord-transitive) models M, “x ∈ Q” is upward absolute
between M and V .9 Also, we will require that for all x ∈ Q there is a model M knowing
that x ∈ Q. This is only possible if Q ⊂ hco (since every countable ord-transitive model is
hereditarily countable modulo ordinals), but it is not required that Q ⊆ H(ℵ1) (as it is the
case when using countable transitive models only).
It is natural to allow parameters other than just reals. The following is a simple example
of a definable iteration using a function p : ω1 → 2 as parameter: (Pβ, Qβ)β<ω1 is the
countable support iteration such that Qβ is Miller forcing if p(β) = 0 and random forcing
if p(β) = 1.
Once we use such a parameter p, we of course cannot assume that p is in the model M
(since M is countable and ord-transitive). Instead, we will assume that M contains its own
version pM of the parameter; in our example we would require that δ := ωV1 ∈ M and that
M thinks that pM is a function from δ to 2, (so really dom(pM) = δ ∩ M) and we require
that pM(β) = p(β) for all β ∈ M.
More generally we define “p is a nep parameter” by induction on the rank: ∅ is a nep-
parameter, and
Definition 2.1. p is a nep-parameter, if p is a function with domain β ∈ ON and p(α) is a
nep-parameter for all α ∈ β.
Let M be an ord-transitive model. Then pM is the M-version of p, if dom(pM) = dom(p)∩M
and pM(α) is the M-version of p(α) for all α ∈ dom(pM).
9There are useful notions similar to nep without this property. Examples for such forcings appear naturally
when iterating nep forcings, cf. Subsection 4.1.
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In other words: A nep-parameter is just an arbitrary set together with a hereditary
wellorder.
If M contains pM , then M thinks that pM is a nep-parameter (and if β = dom(p), then
β ∈ M and M thinks β = dom(pM)).
We can canonically code a real r, an ordinal, or a subset of the ordinals as a nep-
parameter.
Definition 2.2. Let p be a nep-parameter. M is a (ZFC∗, p)-candidate, if M is a countable,
ord-transitive, successor absolute model of ZFC∗ and contains pM, the M-version of p.
We can require many additional absoluteness conditions for candidates, e.g., the abso-
luteness of the canonical coding of α × α, or cf ω-absoluteness. The more conditions we
require, the less candidates we will get, i.e., the weaker the properness notion “for all can-
didates, there is a generic condition” is going to be. In practice however, these distinctions
do not seem to matter: All nep forcings will satisfy the (stronger) official definition, and
for all applications weaker versions suffices.
To be more specific: Most applications will only use properness for candidates M that
satisfy
(2.1) M is an internal forcing extension of an elementary submodel N.
More exactly: We start with N ≺ H(χ), pick some P ∈ N, set (N′, P′) = ord-col(N, P), and
let G ∈ V be P′-generic over N′. Some application might also use
(2.2) M is an elementary submodel in a P-extension, for a σ-complete P.
More exactly: Let P be σ-complete, pick in the P-extension V[G] some N ≺ HV[G](χ) and
let N′ be the ord-collapse. Then N′ is in V (and an ord-transitive model).
Of course all these models satisfy a variety of absoluteness properties (such as the
canonical coding of α × α etc). So for all applications, it would be enough to consider
candidates that satisfy (2.1) (or some exotic application might need (2.2)), but we we do
not make the properties (2.1) or (2.2) part of the official definition of “candidate”, since
both properties are much more complicated (and less absolute) than just “M is a countable,
ord-transitive ZFC∗-model”.
Note however that generally we can not assume that the P used in (2.1) is proper or even
just ω1-preserving. For example in the application in [KS05], we need P to be a collapse
of ℵ1. So in particular we can not assume that all candidates are cf ω-absolutene.
We will only be interested in the normal case:
Definition 2.3. ZFC∗ is normal, if H(χ)  ZFC∗ for sufficiently large regular χ.
Sometimes we will assume that ZFC∗ is element of a candidate M. This allows us to
formulate, e.g., “M thinks that M′ is a candidate”. We can guarantee this by choosing
ZFC∗ recursive, or by coding it into p.
Lemma 2.4. (1) (Assuming normality.) If N ≺ H(χ) contains p, and (M, pM) is the
ord-collapse of (N, p), then M is candidate and pM is the M-version of p.
(2) The statements “pM is the M-version of p” is absolute between transitive uni-
verses. If pM is the M-version of p, and M thinks that M′ is ord-transitive and that
pM′ is the M′-version of pM , then pM′ is the M′-version of p.
(3) If M[G] is a forcing extension of M, and pM the M-version of p, then pM is also
the M[G]-version of p.
(4) For x ∈ hco, a nep parameter p and a theory T in the language {∈, cx, cp}, the exis-
tence of a candidate M containing x such that (M, ∈, x, pM) satisfies T is absolute
between universes containing ωV1 (and, of course, x,p and T).
This is straightforward, apart from the last item, which follows from the following mod-
ification of Shoenfield absoluteness.
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Remark 2.5. Shelah’s paper [She04] uses another notion of nep-parameter With our defi-
nition, for every p and M there is exactly one M-version pM of p, but this is not the case
for Shelah’s notion. (There, a candidate is defined as pair (M, pM) such that pM ∈ M is an
M-version of p.) Both notions satisfy Lemma 2.4.
Lemma 2.6. Assume that
• S is a set of sentences in the first order language using the relation symbol ∈ and
the constant symbols cx, cp,
• ZFC∗ ⊆ ZFC,
• L′ is a transitive ZFC-model (set or class) containing ZFC∗, ωV1 , p, and S ,
• x ∈ hcoL′ .
If in V there is a (ZFC∗, p)-candidate M containing x such that (M, ∈, x, pM)  S , then
there is such a candidate in L′.
Proof. We call such a candidate a good candidate. So we have to show:
(2.3) If there is a good candidate in V , then there is one in L′.
Just as in the proof of Shoenfield absoluteness, we will show that a good candidate M
corresponds to an infinite descending chain in a partial order T defined in L′. (Each node
of T is a finite approximation to M). Then we use that the existence of such a chain is
absolute.
We define for a nep-parameter y
(2.4) f-clos(y) = {y(a) : a ∈ dom(y)} ∪
⋃
a∈dom(y)
f-clos(y(a)).
So every z ∈ f-clos(y) is again a nep-parameter.
Fix in L′ for every y ∈ ({x} ∪ trans-clos(x)) \ ON an enumeration
(2.5) y = { f y(n) : n ∈ ω}.
Also in L′, we fix some δ ≥ ωV1 bigger than every ordinal in {x} ∪ trans-clos(x) and bigger
than dom(y) for every y ∈ f-clos(p) ∪ {p}.
We can assume that S contains ZFC∗ as well as the sentence “cp is a nep-parameter”.
We use (in L′) the following fact:
Let S be a theory of the countable (first-order) language LS . Then there
is a theory S ′ (of a countable language LS ′ ⊃ LS ) such that the deductive
closure of S ′ is a conservative extension of S , and every sentence in S ′
has the form (∀x1)(∀x2) . . . (∀xn)(∃y)ψ(x1, . . . , xn, y) for some quantifier
free formula ψ (using new relation symbols of S ′).
So we fix S ′ and L′, consisting of relation symbols Ri (i ∈ ω) of arity ri ≥ 1, and
constant symbols ci (i ∈ ω). We can assume that there are constant symbols for ω and for
each natural number. We can further assume
• c0 = cx, c1 = cp,
• R0 = Rǫ(x, y) expresses x ∈ y,
• R1 = Rdom(x, y) expresses “x is a function and dom(x) = y”,
• R2 = Rf-clos(x) expresses x ∈ f-clos(cp) ∪ {cp},
• R3 = RON(x) expresses x ∈ ON.
We set L′i = {R0 . . .Ri−1, c0 . . . ci−1}. and fix an enumeration (ϕi)i∈ω of all sentences
in S ′ such that ϕi is a L′i -sentence. We now define the partial order T as follows: A
node t ∈ T consists of the natural number nt, the sequences (cti)i≤nt and (Rti)i≤nt , and the
following functions with domain nt: ord-valt, x-valt, p-valt, and rkt such that the following
is satisfied:
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• nt ≥ 4. We interpret nt = {0, . . . , nt − 1} to be the universe of the following L′
nt
-
structure: cti ∈ nt is the t-interpretation of ci and Rti ⊆ (nt)ri is the t-interpretation
of Ri for all i < nt.
• ord-valt : nt → δ ∪ {na}. If ci is the constant symbol for some m ≤ ω, then
ord-valt(cti) = m. If ord-valt(a) , na, then we have the following: RON
t(a) holds,
and R∈t(b, a) holds iff ord-valt(b) ∈ ord-valt(a). (Where we use the notation that
na < y for all y.)
• x-valt : nt → {x}∪trans-clos(x)∪{na} such that x-valt(cxt) = x. If x-valt(a) < ON∪
{na}, then R∈t(b, a) iff x-valt(b) ∈ x-valt(a). If x-valt(a) ∈ ON, then x-valt(a) =
ord-valt(a).
• p-valt : nt → {p} ∪ f-clos(p) ∪ {na} such that p-valt(cpt) = p and p-valt(a) , na iff
Rf-clos t(a). If Rf-clost(a) and Rdomt(a, b), then ord-valt(b) = dom(p-valt(a)).
• rkt : nt → δ is a rank-function. I.e., if R∈t(a, b), then rkt(a) < rkt(b).
We set t ≥T t′ if
• nt′ ≥ nt, and all the interpretations and functions in t′ are extensions of the ones in
t. (So we will omit the indices t and t′.)
• If i ≤ nt, and ϕi ∈ S ′ is the sentence (∀x1) . . . (∀xl)(∃y)ψ(~x, y), then for all ~a in nt
there is a b ∈ nt′ such that t′  ψ(~a, b).
• Assume that i < nt, a < nt and x-val(a) = y < ON ∩ {na}. Then there is a b < nt′
such that x-val(b) = f y(i), cf. (2.5).
Then we get the following:
• T is a partial order.
• The definition of T can be spelled out in L′, the definition is absolute, and every
node of T is element of L′. So T is element of L′.
• In particular T has an infinite descending chain in L′ iff T has one in V .
• T has an infinite descending chain iff there is a good candidate.
Let us show just the last item: Clearly, a suitable candidate defines an infinite descending
chain: Given M, we can extend it to an S ′-model (since S ′ is a conservative extension of
S ) and find a rank function rk for M. Then we can construct a chain as a subset of those
nodes t ∈ T that correspond to finite subsets of M: To every such t we just have to put
enough elements into t′ to witness the requirements.
On the other hand, a chain defines a candidate: The union of the structures in the chain
is a L′-structure M′ and an S ′-model. The function rk defines a rank on M′. So we can
define by induction on this rank a function i : M′ → V the following way:
i(x) =

ord-val(a) if ord-val(x) , na
{i(y) : y ∈ x} otherwise.
We set M′ = i[M]. By induction, i is an isomorphism between (M′,R∈,RON, xM′ , pM′ ) and
(M, ∈,ON, x, pM), i.e., that M is the required good candidate. 
Remark 2.7. • If p is a real, then the transitive collapse of a candidate still is a can-
didate. So if x is a real and S as above, the existence of an appropriate candidate
is equivalent to the existence of a transitive candidate, which is a
˜
Σ12 statement (in
the parameters p, x, S ).
• There is also a notion of non-wellfounded non elementary (nw-nep) forcing, cf. [She05],
where candidates do not have to be wellfounded. Then the existence of a candidate
(with a real parameter) is even a
˜
Σ11-statement.
2.2. Non elementary proper forcing. We investigate forcing notions Q defined with a
nep-parameter p: Q = {x : ϕ∈Q(x, p)}. If M is a (ZFC∗, p)-candidate, we assume that in
M the class {x : ϕ∈Q(x, pM)} is a set, which we will denote by QM . Generally such a QM
does not have to be a subset of M, but to simplify notation (as in Assumption 1.12) we
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assume that Q is disjoint to ON (we can assume that this requirement is explicitly stated
in the formula ϕ∈Q). Then QM ⊂ M. Analogously, we assume that q ≤ p iff ϕ≤Q(q, p, p),
and that in M, {(p, q) : ϕ≤Q(q, p, pM)} is a partial order on QM . We write q ≤M p for
M  ϕ≤Q(q, p, pM). Additionally we require that these formulas are upwards absolute. To
summarize:
Definition 2.8. • M1 is a candidate in M2 means the following: M1 is a candidate,
M2 is either a candidate or M2 = V , M1 ∈ M2, and M2 knows that M1 is countable.
• ϕ(x) is upwards absolute for candidates means: If M1 is a candidate in M2, a ∈ M1,
and M1  ϕ(a), then M2  ϕ(a).
• A forcing Q is upwards absolutely defined by the nep-parameter p, if the following
is satisfied:
In V and all (ZFC∗, p)-candidates M, ϕ∈Q defines a set and ϕ≤Q defines a semi
partial order on this set, and ϕ∈Q and ϕ≤Q are upwards absolute for candidates.
As usual, we define:
Definition 2.9. q ∈ Q is Q-generic over M (or just: M-generic), if q forces that (the
V-generic filter) GQ is QM-generic over M.
Recall that “G is M-generic” is defined in 1.11. Of course, GQ will generally not be a
subset of QM .
Note that “p ∈ Q”, “q ≤ p” and therefore “p ‖ q” are upward absolute, but ⊥ is not. (It
will be absolute in most simple examples of nep-forcing, but typically not in nep-iterations
or similar constructions using nep forcings as building blocks). This effect is specific for
nep forcing, it appears neither in proper forcing (since for N ≺ H(χ), incompatibility
always is absolute), nor in Suslin proper (since the absoluteness of incompatibility is part
of the definition).
Since ⊥ is not absolute, “q is M-generic” is generally not equivalent to “q forces that all
dense D in M meet G”. (The V-generic G is not necessarily a QM-filter.)
Now we can finally define:
Definition 2.10. Q is a non elementary proper (nep) forcing for (ZFC∗, p), defined by
formulas ϕ∈Q(x, p), ϕ≤Q(x, y, p), if
• Q is upwards absolutely defined for (ZFC∗, p)-candidates, and
• for all (ZFC∗, p)-candidates M and for all p ∈ QM there is an M-generic q ≤ p.
Sometimes we will denote the p and ZFC∗ belonging to Q by pQ and ZFC∗Q and denote
a (ZFC∗Q, pQ)-candidate by “Q-candidate”.
We will only be interested in normal forcings:
Definition 2.11. A nep-definition Q is normal, if
• ZFC∗ is normal (cf. 2.3),
• Q ⊆ hco in V and in all candidates (cf. 1.9),
• “p ∈ Q” and “q ≤ p” are absolute between V and H(χ) (for sufficiently large
regular χ).
If ZFC∗ is normal, then the ord-collapse collapse of any N ≺ H(χ) containing p is a
candidate. So we get:
Lemma 2.12. If Q is normal, then for any p ∈ Q there is a candidate M such that q ∈ QM .
If Q is normal and nep, then Q is proper.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 2.4 (and the fact that in the definition of proper
one can assume that the elementary submodels contain an arbitrary fixed parameter, see
e.g. [Gol93, Def. 3.7]). 
As already mentioned, we are only interested in normal forcings, and we will later
tacitly assume normality whenever we say a forcing is nep.
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Remark 2.13. However, it might sometimes make sense to investigate non-normal nep
forcings. Of course such forcings do not have to be proper. An example can be found
in [She04, 1.19]: We assume CH in V , and define a forcing Q for which we get generic
conditions not for all ZFC− models, but for all models of 2ℵ0 = ℵ2. This forcing can
collapse ℵ1.
2.3. Some simple properties. Shoenfield absoluteness 2.6 immediately gives us many
simple cases of absoluteness. We just give an example: If Q is upward absolutely defined
and normal, then q ≤ p is equivalent to “there is a candidate M thinking that q ≤ p”. So in
particular:
Corollary 2.14. Assume that V ′ is an extension of V with the same ordinals, and that Q is
(normal) nep in V as well as in V ′. Then p ∈ Q, q ≤ p and p ‖ q are absolute between V
and V ′. (But “A is a maximal antichain” is only downwards absolute from V ′ to V.)
The basic theorem of forcing can be formulated as: For a transitive countable model M
and P in M
(2.6) [M  p  ϕ(
˜
τ)] iff
[
M[G]  ϕ(
˜
τ[G]) for every M-generic filter G ∈ V containing p] .
(And there always is at least one M-generic filter G ∈ V containing p.)
By 1.17 we get the following:
(2.7) If M is a countable, ord-transitive model and P ∈ M, then (2.6) holds.
With the usual abuse of notation, the essential property of proper forcing can be formu-
lated as follows: If M is an elementary submodel of H(χ) and Q in M is proper, then
(2.8) [M  p  ϕ(
˜
τ)] iff
[
M[G]  ϕ(
˜
τ[G]) for every M- and V-generic filter G containing p] .
(And there always is at least one M- and V-generic filter containing p.)
For nep forcings we get exactly the same:
(2.9) If Q is nep and M a Q-candidate, then (2.8) holds.
If M1 is a candidate in M2, and q is Q-generic over M1, then q does not have to be
generic over M2 (since M2 can see more dense sets). Of course, the other direction also
fails: If q is M2-generic, then generally it is not M1-generic (corresponding to the fact in
non-ccc proper forcing that not every V-generic filter has to be N-generic): M1 could think
that D is predense, but M2 could know that D is not, or M1 could think that p1 ⊥ p2, but
M2 sees that p1 ‖ p2. Even for very simple Q satisfying that ⊥ is absolute “{pi : i ∈ ω} is
a maximal antichain” need not be upwards absolute (in contrast to Suslin proper forcing,
see example 3.10).
3. Examples
There are oodles of examples nep forcings. Actually:
Rule of Thumb 3.1. Every nicely definable forcing notion that can be proven to be proper
is actually nep.
This rule does not seem to be quite true. A very partial potential counterexample is 3.17.
However, the rule seems to hold in most cases, and becomes even truer if the proof of
properness uses some form of pure decision and fusion, e.g., for σ-closed or Axiom A.
(And in these cases, the proof of the nep property is just a trivial modification of the proof
of properness.)
Overview of this section:
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• Transitive nep forcing: The forcings is a set of reals, the definition uses only a real
parameter. In this case it is enough to consider transitive candidates.
3.1 Suslin proper and Suslin+.
3.2 A specific example from the theory of creature forcing.
• Non-transitive nep: The forcings are not subsets of H(ℵ1), and we have to use
non-transitive candidates.
3.3 Trival examples: σ-closed forcings.
3.4 Products of creature forcings and similar constructions.
Other examples of of non-transitive nep forcings are iterations of nep forcings. We
will investigate countable support iterations in the Section 4.
• Additional topics:
3.5 Nep, creature forcing, and Zapletal’s idealized forcing.
3.6 Counterexamples: forcings that are not nep.
3.1. Suslin proper forcing. Assume that Q ⊆ ωω is defined using a real parameter p.
In this case it is enough to consider transitive candidates: Such a candidate is just a
countable transitive model of ZFC∗ containing p.10
The first notion of this kind was the following:
Definition 3.2. A (definition of a) forcing Q is Suslin in the real parameter p, if p ∈ Q,
q ≤ p and p ⊥ q are Σ11(p).
For Suslin forcings, the nep property is called “Suslin proper”:
Definition 3.3. • Q is Suslin proper, if Q is Suslin and nep. I.e., for every (transi-
tive) candidate M and every p ∈ QM there is an M-generic q ≤ p.
• Q is Suslin ccc, if Q is Suslin and ccc.
Suslin ccc implies Suslin proper (in a very strong and absolute way, cf. [IS88]). It seems
unlikely that Suslin plus proper implies Suslin proper, but we do not have a counterexam-
ple. Cohen, random, Hechler and Amoeba forcing are Suslin ccc. Mathias forcing is Suslin
proper.
Some forcings are not Suslin proper just because incompatibility is not Borel, for ex-
ample Sacks forcing. This motivated a generalization of Suslin proper, Suslin+ [Gol93,
p. 357]. It is easy to see that every Suslin+ forcing is nep as well, and that many popular
tree-like forcings are Suslin+, e.g., Laver, Sacks and Miller [Kel06].
3.2. An example of a creature forcing. A more general framework for definable forcings
is creature forcing, presented in the monograph [RS99] by Rosłanowski and Shelah. They
introduce many ways to build basic forcings out of creatures, and use such basic forcings
in constructions such as products or iterations.
Typically, the creatures are finite and the basic creature forcing consist of ω-sequences
(or similar hereditarily countable objects made) of creatures. The proofs that such forcings
are proper actually give nep. We demonstrate this effect on a specific example (that will
also be used in Subsection 3.5). This specific example is in fact Suslin proper, but other
simple (and similarly defined) creature forcing notions are nep but not Suslin proper.
We fix a sufficiently fast growing11 function F : ω → ω and set
(3.1) k∗i :=
∏
j<i
F( j).
Definition 3.4. An i-creature is a function φ : P(a) → ω such that
• a ⊆ F(i) is nonempty.
10More specifically, the straightforward proof shows that in this case “Q is nep” — i.e. “nep with respect to
all ord-transitive models” — is equivalent to: “Q is nep with respect to all transitive models”.
11It is enough to assume F(i) > 2i(k
∗
i )
.
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• φ is monotonic, i.e., b ⊂ c ⊆ a implies φ(b) ≤ φ(c).
• φ has bigness, i.e., φ(b ∪ c) ≤ max(φ(b), φ(c))+ 1 for all b, c ⊆ a.
• φ(∅) = 0 and φ({x}) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ a.
We set val(φ) ≔ a, nor(φ) ≔ φ(a), and we call φ1 stronger than φ0, or: φ1 ≤ φ0, if
val(φ1) ⊆ val(φ0) and φ1(b) ≤ φ0(b) for all b ⊆ val(φ1).
For every φ and x ∈ val(φ) there is a stronger creature φ′ with domain {x}. For each i,
there are only finitely many i-creatures.
Another way to write bigness is:
(3.2) If b = c1 ∪ c2 ⊆ a then either φ(c1) ≥ φ(b) − 1 or φ(c2) ≥ φ(b) − 1.
Definition 3.5. A condition p of P is a sequence (p(i))i∈ω such that p(i) is an i-creature
and lim infi→∞
k∗i√nor(p(i)) = ∞. A condition q is stronger than p, if q(i) is stronger than
p(i) for all i.
Given a p ∈ P, we can define the trunk of p as follows: Let l be maximal such that
val(p(i)) is a singleton {xi} for all i < l. Then the trunk is the sequence (xi)i<l.
We define the P-name
˜
η to be the union of all trunks of conditions in the generic filter.
For every n, the set of conditions with trunk of length at least n is (open) dense. If q ≤ p
then the trunk of q extends the trunk of p. So
˜
η is the name of a real, more specifically
˜
η ∈∏i∈ω F(i).
P is nonempty: For example, the following is a valid condition: val(p(n)) = F(n), and
p(n)(b) = ⌊log2(|b|)⌋.
Lemma 3.6. P satisfies fusion and pure decision, so P is ωω-bounding and nep (and in
particular proper).
Sketch of proof. This is an simple case of [RS06, 2.2]. We give an overview of the proof,
which uses the creature-forcing concepts of bigness and halving:
Bigness: Assume that φ is an i-creature with nor(φ) > 1, and that F : val(φ) → 2. Then
there is a ψ ≤ φ such that nor(ψ) ≥ nor(φ) − 1 and such that F ↾ val(ψ) is constant.
(This follows immediately from (3.2).)
Halving: Let φ be an i-creature. Then there is an i-creature half(φ) ≤ φ such that
• nor(half(φ)) ≥ ⌈nor(φ)/2⌉.
• If ψ ≤ half(φ) and nor(ψ) > 0, then there is a ψ′ ≤ φ such that nor(ψ′) ≥ ⌈nor(φ)/2⌉
and val(ψ′) ⊆ val(ψ).
(Proof: Define half(φ) by val(half(φ)) = val(φ) and half(φ)(b) = max(0, φ(b)−⌊nor(φ)/2⌋).
Given ψ as above, we set b := val(ψ) and define ψ′ by val(ψ′) = b and ψ′(c) = φ(c) for all
c ⊆ b. Then
0 < nor(ψ) = ψ(b) ≤ half(φ)(b) = φ(b) − ⌊nor(φ)/2⌋,
so nor(ψ′) = φ(b) ≥ ⌈nor(φ)/2⌉.)
Fusion: We define q ≤m p by: q ≤ p, q ↾ m = p ↾ m, and for all n ≥ m either
q(n) is equal to p(n) or k
∗
n
√
nor(q(n)) > m. If (pn)n∈ω is a sequence of conditions such that
pn+1 ≤n+1 pn, then there is a canonical limit p∞ < pn.
Set pos(p, n) = ∏i<n val(p(n)). For s ∈ pos(p, n), we construct p ∧ s ≤ p by enlarging
the stem of p to be s (or, if the stem was larger than n to begin with, then the stem extends
s and we set p ∧ s = p). The set {p ∧ s : s ∈ pos(p, n)} is predense under p. Let D be an
open dense set. We say that p essentially is in D, if there is an n ∈ ω such that p ∧ s ∈ D
for all s ∈ pos(p, n).
Pure decision: For p ∈ P, n ∈ ω and D ⊆ P open dense there is a q ≤n p essentially in
D.
Then the rest follows by a standard argument:
Nep: Note that p ∈ P and q ≤ p and q ≤k p are Borel (so p ⊥ q is absolute; actually⊥ is
Borel as well, i.e., P is Suslin proper). Fix a transitive model M and a p0 ∈ PM. Enumerate
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all the dense sets in M as D1, D2, . . . . Given pn ∈ M, pick in M some pn+1 ≤n+1 pn
essentially in Dn+1. In V , build the limit pω ≤ p0. Then pω is M-generic: Let G be a P-
generic filter over V containing pω. Fix m ∈ ω. We have to show that G∩M meets Dm. Note
that G contains pm (since pω ≤ pm). In M, there is an n ∈ ω such that pm ∧ s ∈ Dm for all
s ∈ pos(pm, n). The definitions of pos(pm, n) as well as pm ∧ s are absolute between M and
V , the set pos(pm, n) is finite (and therefore subset of M), the set {pm ∧ s : s ∈ pos(pm, n)}
is predense (in V), so pm ∧ s ∈ G for some s ∈ pos(pm, n). So we get G ∩ M ∩ Dm , ∅.
Continuous reading of names and therefore ωω-bounding follows equally easily.
It remains to show pure decision. Fix p, n and D and set p0 = p. Given pm, we construct
pm+1 as follows:
• Choose
(3.3) hm > n + m such that
k∗l√
nor(pm(l)) > n + 2m for all l ≥ hm.
• Enumerate pos(pm) as s1, . . . , sM . Note that M ≤ k∗hm , according to (3.1).
• Set p0m = pm. Given pk−1m , pick pkm such that
– nor(pkm(l)) > (n + 2m)k
∗
l /2k for all l ≥ hm.
– pkm(l) = pm(l) for l < hm.
– Either pkm ∧ sk is essentially in D (deciding case), or it is not possible to find
such a condition then pkm(l) = half(pk−1m (l)) for all l ≥ hm (halving case).
• Set pm+1 to be pMm . In particular,
k∗l√nor(pm+1(l)) > (n + 2m)/2 for all l ≥ hm.
Let pω be the limit of all the pm. For every n ∈ ω define by downward induction on
h = n, n − 1, . . . , h0 the h-creatures φn,h and sets Λn,h ⊆ pos(pω, h) in the following way:
• Λn,n is the set of s ∈ pos(pω, n) such that pω ∧ s is essentially in D.
• Assume h0 ≤ h < n. So for all s ∈ pos(pω, h) some of the extensions in of s to
pos(pω, h + 1) will be in Λn,h+1 while others will be not. By shrinking pω(h) at
most k∗h many times, each time using bigness, we can guarantee that the resulting
h-creature φn,h satisfies: For all s ∈ pos(pω, h) either all extension compatible with
φn,h are in Λn,h+1 or no extension is. Set Λn,h to be the set of those s such that the
extensions all are in Λn,h+1. Note that
k∗h
√
φn,h > 1/2
k∗h√pω(h).
For each h, there are only finitely many possibilities for Λn,h and φn,h, so using Ko¨nig’s
lemma, we can get a sequence (φ∗,h,Λ∗,h)h0≤h<ω such that for all N there is an n > N such
that
(3.4) (φ∗,h,Λ∗,h) = (φn,h,Λn,h) for all h0 ≤ h ≤ N.
We claim
(3.5) Λ∗,h0 = pos(pω, h0)
Then we choose any n such that Λn,h0 = Λ∗,h0 and define q by
q(l) =

pω(l) if l < h0 or l ≥ n
φl,h otherwise.
Then q essentially is in D, according to (3.5) and the definition of Λn,h.
So it remains to show (3.5). Assume towards a contradiction that s ∈ pos(pω) \ Λ∗,h0 .
Let q′ be the condition with stem s and the creatures (φ∗,h)h0≤h<ω. Pick some r ≤ q′ in D.
Let s′ be the trunk of r. So s′ extends s. Let h be the length of s′. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that
(3.6) k
∗
l
√
nor(r(l)) > 2 for all l ≥ h
and that h = hm for some m, where hm is the number picked in (3.3) to construct pm+1. In
particular, s′ = sk for some k, so
(3.7) r ≤ pkm
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We know that r ∈ D. This implies that
(3.8) r′ ≔ pkm ∧ sk essentially is in D (and r ≤ r′).
Assume otherwise. Then pick H > hm such that
k∗l√nor(r(l)) > (n + 2m)/2 for all l ≥ H.
For hm ≤ l < H, we can unhalve r(l) to get some r˜(l) with norm at least nor(pk−1m )/2 >
(n + 2m)k∗l /2k. Then the condition consisting of trunk s′, the creatures r˜(l) for hm ≤ l < H
and r(l) for l ≥ H would be a suitable condition for the deciding case, a contradiction to
the fact that we are in the halving case. This shows (3.8).
Note that pω ∧ s′ ≤ pkm ∧ s′, so by (3.8) we get that pω ∧ s′ essentially is in D. We can
now derive the desired contradiction:
(3.9) pω ∧ s′ is not essentially in D.
Proof: Assume otherwise, i.e., for some N every s′′ ∈ pos(pω, N) extending s′ is in D. Pick
n > N as in (3.4). Then according to the definition of Λn,h, we get s′ ∈ Λn,hm and therefore
s ∈ Λn,h0 , a contradiction. This shows (3.9). 
3.3. σ-closed forcing notions. The simplest (and not very interesting) examples of non-
transitive nep-forcings are the σ-closed ones. We use the following obvious fact:
Fact 3.7. Assume that Q is upwards absolutely defined, that ⊥ is upwards absolute as well
(and therefore absolute) and that Q is σ-closed (in V). Then Q is nep.
It is not enough to assume that Q is ccc (in V and all candidates) instead of σ-closed,
see Example 3.17.
So the following definition of Q = { f : ω1 → ω1 partial, countable} is nep:
Example 3.8. Define Q by p = ω1 and f ∈ Q if f : p → p is a countable partial function.
Then Q is nep.
Note that we cannot use ω1 in the definition directly, since there are candidates M such
that ωM1 > ω
V
1 . Neither could we use f : α → p, α ∈ p, since such an f in a candidate M
really has domain α ∩ M, which is generally not an ordinal (i.e., this definition would not
be upwards absolute).
More generally, we can get the examples:
Example 3.9. Assume that p codes the ordinals κp and λp, and set Q = { f : κp →
λp partial, countable} (ordered by extension). Then Q is nep.
This example shows that a nep forcing can look completely different in different can-
didates: Assume κp = ω1 and λp = ω2. So in V , Q collapses ω2 to ω1. Let N ≺ H(χ),
M = ord-col(N), and M0 ∈ V a forcing-extension of M for the collapse of ω1 to ω. Then
M0 is a candidate, and M0 thinks that ωV1 is countable, so Q is trivial in M0. If M1 ∈ V is a
forcing-extension of M for the collapse of ω2 to ω1, then in M1 Q is isomorphic to the set
of countable partial functions from ω1 to ω1.
A slight variation (still σ-closed):
Example 3.10. Set p = ω1, Q = { f : p→ L∩2ω partial, countable} (ordered by extension).
Then Q is nep, and there is a candidate M which thinks that A is a countable maximal
antichain of QM , but A is not maximal in V .
Proof. x ∈ L is upwards absolute, so ∈Q, ≤Q and ⊥Q are upwards absolute. Clearly Q is
σ-closed in V . So Q is nep. Assume V = L, and pick some N ≺ Lκ for κ regular. Set
M = ord-col(N). In L, construct M′ as a forcing-extension of M for the collapse of ω1
to ω. Then M′ thinks L ∩ 2ω is countable, i.e., that {(0, x) : x ∈ L ∩ 2ω} is a countable
maximal antichain. 
Another, trivial example for a countable antichain with non-absolute maximality is the
(trivial) forcing defined by Q = {1Q} ∪ (L ∩ 2ω) and x ≤ y iff y = 1Q or x = y.
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3.4. Non-transitive creature forcing. Some creature forcing constructions use a count-
able support product (or a similar construction) built from basic creature forcings. In the
useful cases these forcings can be shown to be proper, and the proof usually also shows
nep. One would take the index set of the product to be an ordinal κ, and choose the nep pa-
rameter p with domain κ such that p(α) is the nep-parameter (a real) for the basic creature
forcings Qα.
To give the simplest possible example:
Lemma 3.11. The countable support product (of any size) of Sacks forcings is nep.
Proof. Again, the standard proof of properness works. First some notation: A splitting
node is a node that has two immediate successors. The n-th splitting front FTn of a perfect
tree T ⊆ 2<ω is the set of splitting nodes t ∈ T such that t has exactly n splitting nodes
below it. Note that FTn is a front (i.e., it meets every branch) and therefore finite (since T
has finite splitting). Let κ be the index set of the product. So a condition p consists of a
countable domain dom(p) ⊆ κ and for every i ∈ dom(p) a perfect tree p(i). In particular,
q ≤ p means dom(q) ⊇ dom(p) and q(i) ⊆ p(i) for all i ∈ dom(p).
• For u ⊆ κ finite, q ≤n,u p means: q ≤ p, and F p(i)n = Fq(i)n for all i ∈ u.
• Fusion: If we use some simple bookkeeping, we can guarantee that a sequence
pn+1 ≤n,un pn has a limit pω. (It is enough to make sure that the un are increasing
and that⋃n∈ω un covers dom(pω).)
• For u ⊆ dom(p) finite, we set posu(p, n) =
∏
i∈u F
p(i)
n (a finite set). For η ∈
posu(p, n) there is a canonical p ∧ η ≤ p defined in the obvious way (we increase
some trunks).
• Pure decision: given a condition p, some finite u ⊆ dom(p), some n ∈ ω and an
open dense set D, we can strengthen p to some q ≤n,u p such that q∧ η ∈ D for all
η ∈ posu(q, n).
To show this, just enumerate posu(q, n + 1) as ν0, . . . , νM−1, set p0 = p, given
pm find p′ ≤ p ∧ νm in D and then set pm+1 to be p′ “above νm” and pm “on the
parts incompatible with νm”. Then set q = pM.
• This implies nep: Let the forcing parameter p code κ (e.g., p : κ → {0}). Then
we can define P to consist of all countable partial functions p with domain dom(p)
such that p(α) is a perfect tree for all α ∈ dom(p). This is an absolute definition,
and compatibility is absolute.
Fix p = p0 ∈ M. Enumerate as D0, D1, . . . all sets in M such that M thinks Di
is dense. Given pm−1 ∈ M, pick a suitable um and find in M some pm ≤um,m pm−1
such that pm∧ s ∈ Dm for all s ∈ posu(p,m). In V , fuse the sequence into pω. Then
pω ≤ p is M-generic:
Assume that G contains pω an therefore pm. We know that pm ∧ s is in G for
some s ∈ posum (pm,m). Then pm ∧ s ∈ Dm ∩ M ∩G.
• With similar standard arguments we get ωω-bounding. 
3.5. Idealized forcing. Zapletal [Zap08] developed the theory of (proper) forcing notions
of the form PI = Borel/I for (definable) ideals I. (A smaller set is a stronger condition.)
The generic filter GI of such forcing notions is always determined by a canonical generic
real
˜
ηI . How does nep and creature forcing fit into this framework?
• According to the Rule of Thumb 3.1, most PI which can be shown to be proper, are
in fact nep. But we do not know of any particular theorems or counterexamples.
• In particular, we do not know whether there is a good characterization of the (de-
finable) ideals I such that PI is nep. (Even assuming that PI is proper, which is a
tricky property in itself, cf. [Zap08, 2.2].)
• Most nicely definable forcing notions with hereditarily countable conditions such
that the generic object is determined by a real are equivalent to some PI , and
[Zap08] proves several theorems in that direction. (E.g., in many ccc cases there
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is a natural generic real, and the ideal I can be taken to consist of those Borel sets
that are forced not to contain the generic.) However, there are natural examples of
creature forcings where the generic filter is determined by a generic real and yet
the forcing is not of the form PI . The next lemma gives an example.
• Many of the nice consequences that we get for (transitive) nep forcings also follow
for forcings of the form PI (not assuming nep, but sometimes other additional
properties). For example the preservation Theorem [KS05, 9.4] mentioned in the
introduction corresponds to [Zap08, 6.3.3].
The following lemma is due to Zapletal.12
Lemma 3.12. Let P be the forcing of subsection 3.2.
(1) The generic filter G is determined by the generic real
˜
η.
(2) (P,
˜
η) is not equivalent to a forcing of the form (PI ,
˜
ηI).
To make this precise, we have to specify what we mean with “equivalent”. We use the
following version:
Definition 3.13. A forcing notion P together with the P-name
˜
η are equivalent to PI (with
the canonical generic real
˜
ηI), if there are P-names G′I and
˜
η′I and a PI-name G′ such
that P forces: G′I is the PI-generic filter over V corresponding to the generic real
˜
η′I , and
G′[G′I]PI = G.
I.e., we can reconstruct the P-generic filter G by evaluating the PI-name G′ with the
PI-generic filter G′I .
In particular, this implies
(3.10) (∀p ∈ P) (∃q ≤ p) (∃ ˜B ∈ PI) q P ˜B ∈ G′I & ˜B PI p ∈ G′.
We will need the following straightforward fact:
Lemma 3.14. Assume that (P,
˜
η) is equivalent to PI , and that there is a Borel function f
such that P
˜
η′I = f (
˜
η). Then the canonical map ϕ : PJ → ro(P) defined by B 7→ ~
˜
η ∈ BP
is a dense embedding, where we set J = {B :P
˜
η < BV[G]}.
Proof. Given p ∈ P, we need some B such that 0 , ~
˜
η ∈ B ≤ p. Let q, ˜B, q be as in (3.10),
and set B = f −1 ˜B. In particular ˜B PI p ∈ G′, so
˜
η ∈ B iff f (
˜
η) =∈ ˜B iff
˜
η′I ∈ ˜B iff ˜B ∈ G′I , which implies p ∈ G′[G′I],
i.e., p ∈ G. Also, q P ˜B ∈ G′I , so q ≤ ~
˜
η ∈ B ≤ p. 
A density argument together with [Zap08, 3.3.2] gives the following:
Lemma 3.15. Assume that P is ωω bounding and has Borel reading of names with respect
to the P-name
˜
η and that (P,
˜
η) is equivalent to PI . Fix p0 ∈ P. Then there is a p1 ≤ p0
such that P′ = {p ∈ P : p ≤ p1} satisfies the following: For all p there is a compact set C
such that 0 , ~
˜
η ∈ Cro(P′) ≤ p.
Borel reading means: For all P-names
˜
r for a real and all p ∈ P there is a Borel function
f and a q ≤ p forcing that
˜
r = f (
˜
η).
Note that the forcing of Subsection 3.2 has Borel reading (even continuous reading) of
names from the canonical generic
˜
η.
Proof. Given p0 ∈ P, there is some p1 ≤ p and f Borel such that p1 forces
˜
η′I to bef (
˜
η). So according to Lemma 3.14, the canonical embedding ϕ : PJ → ro(P′) is dense for
J = {B : p1 P
˜
η < BV[G]} and P′ = {p ≤ p1}. Given p ∈ P′, find some Borel-code B such
that ϕ(B) ≤ p. [Zap08, 3.3.2] gives a J-positive compact subset of B. 
12Jindrˇich Zapletal, personal communication, November 2007.
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Proof of 3.12. Proof of (1).
We will use the following property of norms, cf. Definition 3.4:
(3.11) For norms φ0, φ1 with val(φ0) ∩ val(φ1) , ∅ there is a weakest norm
φ0 ∧ φ1 stronger than both φ0 and φ1.
Proof: We define ψ = φ0 ∧ φ1 the following way: val(ψ) = val(φ0) ∩ val(φ1) and ψ(b)
is defined by induction on the cardinality of b: If |b| ≤ 1, then ψ(b) = min(ψ(b) =
minφ0(b), φ1(b)). Otherwise, ψ(b) = min(X(b)), for
X(b) = {φ0(b), φ1(b)} ∪ {1 + max(ψ(b0), ψ(b1)) : b0 ∪ b1 = b}.
We have to show that ψ is a norm: Bigness follows imediately from the definition. It
remains to show monotonicity. We show by induction on b:
(∀c ⊆ b)ψ(c) ≤ ψ(b)
I.e., (∀m ∈ X(b))ψ(c) ≤ m. For m = φ0(b), we have ψ(c) ≤ φ0(c) ≤ φ0(b) = m. The same
holds for m = φ1(b). So assume m = 1 + max(ψ(b0), ψ(b1)), without loss of generality for
nonempty and disjoint b0, b1. Then b0 ∩ c ( b and b1 ∩ c ( b, so by definition ψ(c) ≤
1 + max(ψ(b0 ∩ c), ψ(b1 ∩ c)) which is (by induction) at most 1 + max(ψ(b0), ψ(b1)) = m.
On the other hand it is clear that ψ is the biggest possible norm that is smaller than φ0
and φ1. So we get (3.11).
We will also need:
(3.12) (∀b ⊆ val(φ0 ∧ φ1)) (∃b0, b1) b = b0 ∪ b1 & (φ0 ∧ φ1)(b) ≥ max(φ0(b0), φ1(b1))
Proof: Again, write ψ for φ0∧φ1. By induction on |b|: If ψ(b) = φ0(b), we can set b0 = b
and b1 = ∅. Analogously for ψ(b) = φ1(b). If ψ(b) = 1 + max(ψ(c0), ψ(c1)) for c0 ( b and
c1 ( b, then by induction ψ(c0) ≥ max(φ0(d00), φ1(d10)) and ψ(c1) ≥ max(φ0(d01), φ1(d11)), so
we can set b0 = d00 ∪ d01 and b1 = d10 ∪ d11. Then
ψ(b) =1 + max(ψ(c0), ψ(c1)) ≥ 1 + max(φ0(d00), φ0(d01), φ1(d10), φ1(d10)) ≥
φ0(d00 ∪ d01)
(because of bigness of φ0), and analogously ψ(b) ≥ φ1(d10 ∪ d11). This shows (3.12).
For compatible p, q ∈ P we can define p ∧ q by (p ∧ q)(i) = p(i) ∧ q(i). This is the
weakest condition stronger than both p and q. An immediate consequence of (3.11) is:
p ⊥ q is equivalent to
(3.13) (∃n ∈ ω) val(p(n)) ∩ val(q(n))) = ∅ or
(∃b ⊆ ω infinite) (∃M ∈ ω) (∀n ∈ b) nor(p(n) ∧ q(n)) < Mk∗n .
An obvious candidate for reconstructing the generic filter G from the generic real
˜
η (that
works with many tree-like forcings) would be the set
H0 = {p ∈ P :
˜
η ∈
∏
n∈ω
val(p(n))}.
However, due to the halving property of P, this fails miserably: There are incompatible
conditions q and r with val(q(n)) = val(r(n)) for all n. More specifically, we get the
following: For all p there is an r ≤ p such that
(3.14) r ⊥ half(p), and val(r(n)) ⊆ val(half(p)(n)) for all n.
Proof: Set q(n) = half(p). Pick for all sufficiently large n some an ⊆ val(q(n)) such that
q(n)(an) = 2. Using the halving property, we can find for all n some φn ≤ p(n) such
that val(φn) ⊆ an and nor(φn) > nor(p(n))/2. Set r = (φn)n∈ω. Then r and q cannot be
compatible, since q(n)(val(r(n))) is bounded. This shows (3.14).
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Back to the proof. First note the following: Fix p ∈ P. Let X(p) be the set of all
sequences ¯b = (bn)n∈d where d is an infinite subset of ω and bn ⊆ val(p(n)) such that
{ k
∗
n
√
p(n)(bn) : n ∈ d} is bounded. Fix some ¯b ∈ X(b). Then p forces that
˜
η is not in the set
(3.15)
˜
Np,¯b = {ν ∈
∏
n∈ω
val(p(n)) : (∃∞n ∈ d)ν(n) ∈ bn}.
Proof: Assume towards a contradiction that some p′ ≤ p forces
˜
η ∈
˜
Np,¯b. So there is a
bound M such that p′(n)(bn) < Mk∗n for all n ∈ d. Fix N(n) such that nor(p′(l)) > (n + 1 +
M)k∗l > 1+ (n+M)k∗l for all l > N(n). For all l > N(n) we get p′(l)(val(p′l) \ bl) > (n+M)k
∗
l
(by bigness). Let p′′ be the condition p′(l) ↾ (val(p′l)\bl) for l ∈ (b\N(0)). Then p′′ forces
that
˜
η <
˜
Np,¯b, a contradiction. This shows (3.15).
We claim that the following defines G:
(3.16) H = H0 ∩ {p ∈ P : (∀¯b ∈ X(p) ∩ V)
˜
η <
˜
Np,¯b}.
H ⊇ G by (3.15), so it is enough to show that all p1, p2 ∈ H are compatible. Set bn =
val(p1(n))∩val(p2(n)). Note that bn is nonempty, since p1, p2 ∈ H0. So according to (3.13)
we can assume towards a contradiction that the following holds (in V):
(∃b ⊆ ω infinite) (∃M ∈ ω) (∀n ∈ b) nor(p(n) ∧ q(n)) < Mk∗n .
According to (3.12), we get c1n, c2n such that c1n ∪ c2n = bn and pi(n)(cin) < Mk
∗
n for n ∈ b and
i ∈ {0, 1}. We assumed that
˜
η <
˜
Np1 ,c¯1 , i.e.,
˜
η(n) ∈ c1n for only finitely many n. The same is
true for c2n, a contradiction. This shows (3.16) and therefore item (1).
Note that to construct G from
˜
η, we use the (complicated) set (2ω)V ; compare that with
the much easier construction of H0.
Proof of (2).
Let us assume towards a contradiction that P is equivalent to PI . So it satisfies the
assumptions of Lemma 3.15. Fix p ∈ P′, and set q = half(p). Let C be compact such that
(3.17) 0 , ~
˜
η ∈ C < q.
Then
∏
n∈ω val(q(n)) ⊆ C, since C is closed. Let r ≤ p be incompatible to q such that
val(r(n)) ⊆ val(q(n)) as in (3.14). Then∏n∈ω val(r(n)) ⊆ C, therefore r 
˜
η ∈ C. So r ≤∗ q
by (3.17), which contradicts r ⊥ q. 
3.6. Counterexamples. Being nep is a property of the definition, not the forcing. Of
course we can find for any given proper forcing a definition which is not nep (take any
definition that is not upwards absolute). For the same trivial reasons, a forcing “absolutely
equivalent” to a nep forcing doesn’t have to be nep itself. For example:
Example 3.16. There are upward absolute definitions of (trivial) forcings P, Q s.t. in V
and all candidates, P is a dense suborder of Q, P is nep but Q is not nep.
Proof. Pick p ∈ L∩2ω and a candidate M0 that thinks p < L. Define P = {1, p1, p2}, x ≤P y
iff y = 1 or x = y. Set Q = P ∪ {q1, q2} and define the order on Q by: 1 ≤ qi ≤ pi, and if
p ∈ L, then also p2 ≤ q1 and p1 ≤ q2. These definitions are upwards absolute and P is nep.
However, M0  “q1 ⊥ q2”. But every Q-generic Filter over V contains q1 and q2, so there
cannot be a Q-generic condition over M0. 
If Q, ≤ and ⊥ are Σ11 and Q is ccc, then Q is Suslin ccc, and therefore (transitive)
nep. (One of the reasons is that in the Σ11-case it is absolute for countable antichains to be
maximal.) This is not true anymore if the definition of Q is just Σ12:
Example 3.17. Let Q be random forcing in L ordered by inclusion, i.e.,
Q = {r ∈ L : r is a Borel-code for a non-null-set}.
Then p ∈ Q is Σ12 and q ≤ p and p ⊥ q are (relatively) Borel, and in V and all candidates
Q is ccc. But Q is not nep.
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Proof. Pick in L a (transitive) candidate M such that M thinks that ωL1 (and therefore Q)
is countable. In particular there is for each n ∈ ω a maximal antichain An in M such
that µ(Xn) < 1/n for Xn = ⋃a∈An a. (Of course M thinks that Xn is not in L. But really
it is, simply because M ⊆ L.) Take any q ∈ QV , and pick n such that 1/n < µ(q). Then
q′ = q\Xn is positive and in L, and a generic filter containing q′ does not meet the antichain
An. 
It is however not clear whether Q could not have another definition that is nep, or at
least whether Q is forcing-equivalent to a nep forcing. If L is very small (or very large) in
V , then Q is Cohen (or random, respectively) and thus equivalent to a nep forcing notion.
If V ′ is an extension of V = L by a random real, then in V ′ the forcing Q (which is “random
forcing in L”) seems to be more complicated (it adds an unbounded real, but no Cohen).
We do not know whether in this case Q is equivalent to a nep forcing.
4. Countable support iterations
This section consists of three subsections:
4.1 We introduce the basic notation and preservation theorem. We get generic condi-
tions for the limit, but not an upwards absolute definition of the forcing notion.
4.2 We introduce an equivalent definition of the iteration which is upwards absolute.
So the limit is again nep.
4.3 We modify the notions of Subsection 4.1 to subsets of the ordinals, and give a nice
application.
For this section, we fix a sequence (Qα)α∈ǫ of forcing-definitions and a nep-parameter p
coding the parameters (pα)α∈ǫ , i.e., p is a nep-parameter with domain ǫ and p(α) is the nep-
parameter used to define Qα for each α ∈ ǫ. (So we assume that the sequence of defining
formulas and parameters live in the ground model.)
To further simplify notation, we also assume that candidates are successor-absolute, i.e.,
“α is successor” and the function α 7→ α + 1 are absolute for all candidates.
Remark 4.1. This assumption is not really necessary. Without it, we just have to use “M
thinks that α = ζ + 1” instead of just “α = ζ + 1” in the definition of GMα etc., similarly
to 4.20.
Also, we assume the following (which could be replaced by weaker conditions, but is
satisfied in practice anyway):
• In every forcing extension of V , each Qα is normal nep (for ZFC∗ candidates).
• We only start constructions with candidates M such that generic extensions M[G]
satisfy ZFC∗.13
4.1. Properness without absoluteness. We use the following notation: For any forcing
notion, q ≤∗ p means q  p ∈ G.
Definition 4.2. Let M be a candidate.
• Pβ is the countable support iteration (in other terminology: the limit of) (Pα, Qα)α∈β
(for all β ≤ ǫ). We use Gα to denote the Pα-generic filter over V , and G(α) for the
Qα-generic filter over V[Pα].
• PMβ is the element of M so that M thinks: PMβ is the countable support iteration of
the sequence (Qα)α∈β (for β ∈ ǫ ∩ M).
In certain Pǫ-extensions of V the generic filter G defines a canonical PMǫ -generic GMǫ
over M:
13Formally we can require that M satisfies some stronger ZFC′ and that ZFC′ proves that every formula
of ZFC∗ is forced by all countable support iterations of forcings of the form Qα. Also, we assume that ZFC
proves that H(χ) satisfies ZFC∗ for sufficiently large regular χ, and that ZFC proves that the defining formulas
are absolute between V and H(χ).
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Definition 4.3. Given G ⊂ Pǫ , we define GMα by induction on α ∈ ǫ ∩ M by using the
following definition, provided it results in a PMα -generic filter over M. In that case we say
“G is (M, Pα)-generic”. Otherwise, GMα (and GMβ for all β > α) are undefined.
• If α = ζ + 1, then GMα consists of all p ∈ PMα such that p ↾ ζ ∈ GMζ and p(ζ)[GMζ ] ∈
G(ζ).
• If α is a limit, then GMα is the set of all p ∈ PMα such that p ↾ ζ ∈ GMζ for all
ζ ∈ α ∩ M.
Definition 4.4. • Assume that G is (M, Pα)-generic and ζ ∈ α ∩ M. Then we set
GM(ζ) = {
˜
q[GMζ ] : (∃p) p∪ (ζ,
˜
q) ∈ GM
ζ+1}. I.e., GM(ζ) is the usual Q
M[GMζ ]
ζ
-generic
filter over M[GMζ ] as defined in M[GMα ].
• q is (M, Pα)-generic means that q ∈ Pα forces that the Pα-generic filter G is
(M, Pα)-generic. If p ∈ PMα (or if p is just a PMα -name (in M) for some PMα -
condition), then q is (M, Pα, p)-generic, if q additionally forces that p ∈ GMα (or
that p[GMα ] ∈ GMα , resp.).
The following is an immediate consequence of the definition:
Facts 4.5. • If ζ ∈ M ∩ α, then GM(ζ) = QM[G
M
ζ ]
ζ ∩G(ζ).
• If q is (M, Pα, p)-generic and ζ ∈ M ∩ α, then q ↾ ζ is (M, Pζ , p ↾ ζ)-generic.
GMα is absolute in the following sense:
Lemma 4.6. Assume that M, N are candidates in V, M ∈ N, V ′ is an extension of V,
α ∈ M ∩ ǫ, and G ⊂ Pα is an element of V ′ which is (N, Pα)-generic.
(1) GMα (in V ′) is the same as GNα )Mα (in N[GNα ]). In other words, the PMα -filter calcu-
lated in V ′ from G is the same as the PMα -filter calculated in N[GNα ] from GNα .
(2) In particular, Gα is (M, Pα)-generic iff N thinks that GNα is (M, Pα)-generic.
(3) If G is (M, Pα)-generic and τ a PMα -name (in M), then “x = τ[GMα ]” is absolute
between N[GNα ] and V ′.
Proof. By induction on α ∈ ǫ ∩ M: (2) follows from (1) by definition, and (3) from (1)
using 1.18.
Assume α = ζ + 1. Then p ∈ GMα iff p ↾ ζ ∈ GMζ and p(ζ)[GMζ ] ∈ G(ζ) iff N[GNζ ] 
p ↾ ζ ∈ GMζ (by induction hypothesis 1) and N[GNζ ]  p(ζ)[GMζ ] ∈ GN(ζ) (by induction
hypothesis 3 and the fact that M[GMζ ]  q ∈ Qζ implies N[GNζ ]  q ∈ Qζ).
Now assume α is a limit. Then p ∈ GMα iff (p ↾ ζ ∈ GMζ for all ζ) iff (N  p ↾ ζ ∈ GMζ
for all ζ) (by induction hypothesis 1) iff N  p ∈ GMα . 
So here we use that Qα is upwards absolutely defined in V[Gα], and that M[GMζ ] ∈
N[GN
ζ
] both are candidates.
The definitions are compatible with ord-collapses of elementary submodels:
Lemma 4.7. Let N ≺ H(χ), M = ord-col(N), and let G be Pα-generic over V. Then
(1) G is N-generic iff it is (M, Pα)-generic.
If G is N-generic and p,
˜
τ ∈ N, then
(2) p ∈ G iff ord-colN(p) ∈ GMα ,
(3) ord-colN[Gα ](
˜
τ[G]) = (ord-colN(
˜
τ))[GMα ];
(4) in particular, (M[GMα ], M, ∈) is the ord-collapse of (N[Gα], N, ∈).
Proof. The image of x under the ord-collapse (of the appropriate model, i.e., either N or
N[G]) is denoted by x′. Induction on α:
(1,2 successor, α = ζ + 1.) Assume that G ↾ Pζ =: Gζ is Pζ-generic over N. Fix
p ∈ Pα ∩N. Then p ∈ G iff { p ↾ ζ ∈ Gζ and p(ζ)[Gζ] ∈ G(ζ) } iff {p′ ↾ ζ ∈ GMζ (according
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to induction hypothesis (2)) and p′(ζ)[GMζ ] ∈ G(ζ) (according to induction hypothesis (3))
}14 iff p′ ∈ GMα .
(1,2 limit) Assume that Gζ is Pζ-generic over N for all ζ ∈ α ∩ N. Fix p ∈ Pα ∩ N.
p ∈ G iff { p ↾ ζ ∈ Gζ for all ζ ∈ α∩N } iff p′ ∈ GMζ for all ζ ∈ α∩ M } (by hypothesis (2))
iff p′ ∈ GMα .
(3) Induction on the depth of the name
˜
τ:
Let A ∈ N be a maximal antichain deciding whether
˜
τ ∈ V (and if so, also the value of
˜
τ).
Assume a ∈ A ∩ G ∩ N. If a forces
˜
τ = xˇ for x ∈ V , then M thinks that a′ ∈ GMα forces
˜
τ′
to be x′ ∈ V , so we get
˜
τ′[GMα ] = x′. If a forces that
˜
τ < V , then
˜
τ′[GMα ] = {
˜
σ′[GMα ] : (σ, p) ∈ τ ∩ N, p′ ∈ GMα } = {(
˜
σ[G])′ : (σ, p) ∈ τ ∩ N, p ∈ G}
(by induction). It remains to be shown that this is the ord-collapse of
˜
τ[G] = {
˜
σ[G] : σ ∈
τ}. For this it is enough to note that for all ρ[G] ∈
˜
τ[G] ∩ N[G] there is a (
˜
σ, p) ∈
˜
τ such
that p ∈ G and
˜
σ[G] = ρ[G]. 
Pα satisfies (a version of) the properness condition for candidates:
Lemma 4.8. For every candidate M and p ∈ PMα there is an (M, Pα, p)-generic q such that
dom(q) ⊆ M ∩ α.
The proof is more or less the same as the iterability of properness given in [Gol93].
Since we will later need a “canonical” version of the proof, we will introduce the following
notation:
Definition 4.9. For α < ǫ, let genα be a Pα-name for a function such that the following is
forced by Pα: If M is a candidate, σ : ω → M surjective, and p ∈ QMα then genα(M, σ, p)
is an M-generic element of QV[Gα] stronger than p.
(It is clear that such functions exist, since we assume that Pα forces that Qα is nep. Later
we will assume that we can pick genα in some absolute way, cf. 4.13).
For α ≤ β < ǫ, let Pβ/α denote the set of Pα-names p for elements of Pβ such that Pα
forces p ↾ α ∈ Gα. (I.e., Pβ/α is a Pα-name for the quotient forcing.) As usual, we can
define the M-version: p ∈ PM
β/α
means that p is a PMα -name (in M) for a PMβ -condition, and
if G is (M, Pα)-generic, then p[GMα ] ↾ α ∈ GMα .
Lemma 4.8 is a special case of the following:
Induction Lemma/Definition 4.10. Assume that M is a candidate, σ : ω → M surjective,
α, β ∈ M, α ≤ β ≤ ǫ, p ∈ PM
β/α
, q is (M, Pα)-generic, and that dom(q) ⊆ α ∩ M. We define
the canonical (M, σ, Pβ, p)-extension q+ of q such that q+ ∈ Pβ and q+ is (M, Pβ, p)-generic
and dom(q+) ⊆ M ∩ β.
Proof. Induction on β ∈ M.
Successor step β = ζ+1: By induction we have the canonical (M, σ, Pζ , p ↾ ζ)-extension
q+ ∈ Pζ . In particular, q+ forces that M′ ≔ M[GMζ ] is a candidate and that p′ ≔ p(ζ)[GMζ ] ∈
QM′ζ . By applying σ to the PMζ -names in M, we get a canonical surjection σ′ : ω → M′.
We define the canonical β-extension q++ to be q+ ∪ (ζ, genζ(M′, σ′, p′)). Assume that Gβ
contains q++. Then GMζ is PMζ -generic and contains p ↾ ζ. If A ⊆ PMβ is (in M) a maximal
antichain, then
A′ ≔ {a(ζ) : a ∈ A, a ↾ ζ ∈ GMζ } ⊆ Q
M[GMζ ]
ζ
is a maximal antichain in M[GMζ ]. Since genζ(M′, p′) is in G(ζ), there is exactly one
a′ ∈ A′ ∩G(ζ), i.e., there is exactly one a ∈ A ∩GMβ . So q++ is really (M, Pβ, p)-generic.
14using the fact that that p(ζ)[Gζ ] ∈ Qζ is hereditarily countable modulo ordinals and therefore not changed
by the collapse
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Limit step: Assume α = α0 < α1 . . . is cofinal in M ∩ β. Set D0 = PMβ and let (Dn)n∈ω
enumerate the PMβ -dense subset in M. (Note that we get this enumeration canonically from
σ.) First we define (pn)n∈ω such that p0 = p, pn ∈ PMβ/αn , and (M thinks that) PMαn forces
• pn ∈ Dn,
• pn−1 ↾ αn ∈ GMαn implies pn ≤ pn−1.
Then we pick q = q−1 ⊆ q0 ⊆ q1 . . . such that qn is the canonical (M, σ, Pαn+1 , pn ↾ αn+1)-
generic extension of the (M, Pαn)-generic qn. We set q+ ≔
⋃
n∈ω qn.
By induction we get:
• qn is (M, Pαn+1 , pm ↾ αn+1)-generic for all m ≤ n.
• qn forces pl[GMαn+1 ] ≤ pm[GMαn+1 ] (in PMβ ) for m ≤ l ≤ n + 1.
q+ is GMβ is (M, Pβ, p)-generic: Let G be V-generic and contain q+.
• GMβ meets Dn: pn[GMβ ] ∈ GMβ , since pn[GMβ ] ↾ αm+1 ∈ GMβ for all m ≥ n.
• Let r, s be incompatible in PMβ . In M, the set
D = {p ∈ PMβ : (∃ζ < β)(∃t ∈ {r, s})p ↾ ζ ζ t < Gζ} ⊆ PMβ
is dense, and if p ∈ D ∩GMβ , then p ↾ ζ ∈ GMζ , so t ↾ ζ < GMζ , and t < GMβ .

We repeat Lemma 4.8 with our new notation:
Corollary 4.11. Given a candidate M, σ : ω → M surjective, and p ∈ PMα , we can define
the canonical generic q = gen(M, σ, Pα, p). Also, dom(q) ⊆ M ∩ α.
So Pα satisfies the properness-clause of the nep-definition. However, Pα is not nep,
since the statement “p ∈ Pα” is not upwards absolute.
Remark 4.12. There are two obvious reasons why “p ∈ Pα” is not upwards absolute: First
of all, names look entirely different in various candidates. For example, if M thinks that
˜
τ is the standard name for ω1, then a bigger candidate N will generally see that
˜
τ is not
a standard name for ω1. So if Q is the (trivial) forcing {ω1}, then a condition in P ∗ Q
is a pair (p, q), where P is (essentially) a standard P-name for ω1. So if M thinks that
(p, q) ∈ P ∗ Q, then N (or V) will generally not think that (p, q) ∈ P ∗ Q. So we cannot use
the formula “p ∈ Pα” directly. We will use pairs (M, p) instead, where M is a candidate
and p ∈ PMα . Another way to circumvent this problem would be to use absolute names for
hco-objects (inductively defined, starting with, e.g., “standard name for α”, and allowing
“name for union of (xi)i∈ω” etc). The second reason is that forcing is generally not absolute
(even when we use absolute names): M can wrongly think that p forces that
˜
q2 ≤
˜
q1, i.e.,
that (p,
˜
q2) ≤ (p,
˜
q1) in P ∗
˜
Q. We will avoid this by interpreting (M, p) to be a canonical
(M, Pα, p)-generic.
4.2. The nep iteration: properness and absoluteness. Now we will construct a version
of Pǫ that is forcing equivalent to the usual countable support iteration and upwards abso-
lutely defined. We will need to construct generics in a canonical way, so we assume the
following:
Assumption 4.13. There is an absolute (definition of a) function genα such that Pα forces:
If M is a candidate, σ : ω → M surjective and p ∈ QMα then genα(M, σ, p) is QMα -generic
over M and stronger than p.
Definition 4.14. Pnepα consists of tuples (M, σ, p), where M is a candidate, σ : ω → M
surjective, and p ∈ PMα .
So “x ∈ Pnepα ” obviously is upwards absolute.
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We will interpret (M, σ, p) as the “canonical M-generic condition forcing that p ∈ GMα ”.
(Generally there are many generic conditions, and incompatible ones, so we have to single
out a specific one, the canonical generic, and for this we need 4.13).
Recall the construction of gen from Definition/Lemma 4.10. If we use Assumption 4.13,
we get:
Corollary 4.15. gen : Pnepα → Pα is such that
(1) gen(M, σ, p) is (M, Pα, p)-generic
(2) If M, N are candidates, M, σ ∈ N, and G is (N, Pα)-generic, then genN(M, σ, p) ∈
GNα iff genV (M, σ, p) ∈ G.
(Here, genN is the result of the construction 4.10 carried out inside N, and analo-
gously for V .) Of course gen cannot really be upwards absolute (i.e., we cannot have
genN(M, σ, p) = genV (M, σ, p)), since x ∈ Pα is not upwards absolute. However, (2) gives
us a sufficient amount of absoluteness.
Proof. (1) is clear. For (2), just go through the construction of 4.10 again and check by
induction that this construction is really sufficiently “canonical”, i.e., absolute. 
If σ1 , σ2 both enumerate M, then we do not require gen(M, σ1, p) and gen(M, σ2, p)
to be compatible.
Let us first note that a function gen as above also satisfies the following:
Corollary 4.16. (1) If N thinks that q ≤∗ genN(M, σM , p), then genV (N, σN , q) ≤∗
genV (M, σM , p).
(2) If N ≺ H(χ), p ∈ N, and (N′, p′) is the ord-collapse of (N, p), and σ′ : ω → N′ is
surjective, then gen(N′, σ′, p′) ≤∗ p.
Proof. (1) Assume Gα contains genV (N, σN , q). So Gα is (N, Pα)-generic and GNα contains
q and therefore genN(M, σM, p). So by 4.15(2), Gα contains genV (M, σM , p).
(2) Assume that the V-generic filter G contains gen(N′, σ′, p′). Then by definition, GN′
is N′-generic and contains p′. So G is N-generic and contains p, according to 4.7. 
Now we can define:
Definition 4.17. (M2, σ2, p2) ≤nep (M1, σ1, p1) means: M1, σ1 ∈ M2, and M2 thinks that
(M1 is a candidate and that) p2 ≤∗ genM2 (M1, σ1, p1).
By Corollary 4.16(1) ≤nep is transitive. It follows:
Theorem 4.18. (1) gen : (Pnepα ,≤nep) → (Pα,≤∗) is a dense embedding.
(2) (Pnepα ,≤nep) is nep.
Proof. (1)
• If (M2, σ2, p2) ≤nep (M1, σ1, p1), then gen(M2, σ2, p2) ≤∗ gen(M1, σ1, p1) by 4.16(1).
• If (M2, σ2, p2) ⊥nep (M1, σ1, p1), then gen(M2, σ2, p2) ⊥∗ gen(M1, σ1, p1):
Assume that q ≤∗ gen(Mi, σi, pi) (i ∈ {1, 2}). Let N ≺ H(χ) contain q and
Mi, σi, pi, and let (M3, p3) be the ord-collapse of (N, q) and σ3 : ω → M3 sur-
jective. Then (M3, σ3, p3) ≤nep (Mi, σi, pi).
• gen is dense: For p ∈ Pα pick an N ≺ H(χ) containing p and let (N′, p′) be the
ord-collapse of (N, p). Then gen(N′, p′) ≤∗ p, according to 4.16.2.
(2): The definitions of Pnep and ≤nep are clearly upwards absolute. If N is a candidate
and N thinks (M, p) ∈ Pnep, then (N, genN(M, p)) ≤nep (M, p) is N-generic:
Assume Gnep is a Pnep-generic filter over V containing (N, q) (for some q). Since gen is
a dense embedding, Gnep defines a Pα-generic filter Gα over V , and Gα contains gen(N, q).
This implies that Gα is (N, Pα)-generic.
We have to show that Gneq ∩ Pnep,N is Pnep,N-generic over N. In N, the mapping
genN : Pnep,N → PNα is dense, and GNα is PNα -generic over N. So the set G′ = {(M, p) :
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genN(M, p) ∈ GNα } is Pnep,N-generic over N. But (M, p) ∈ G′ iff (M, p) ∈ G, according to
4.15(2). 
Remark 4.19. So the properties 4.15(1) and 4.16(1) are enough to show that Pnep can
be densely embedded into Pα. But 4.15(2) is needed to show that Pnep actually is nep:
Otherwise Pnep still is an upwards absolute forcing definition, and for every p ∈ (Pnep)M
there is a q ≤ p in Pnep forcing that there is an (Pnep)M-generic filter over M, namely the
reverse image of GMα under genM but this filter doesn’t have to be the same as Gnep∩(Pnep)M.
4.3. Iterations along subsets of ǫ. As before we assume that (Qα)α∈ǫ is a sequence of
forcing-definitions.
We can of course define a countable support iteration along every subset w of ǫ:
Pw, the c.s.-iteration of (Qα)α∈w along w, is defined by induction on α ∈ w: Pw∩α consists
of functions p with countable domain ⊆ w ∩ α. If α is the w-successor of ζ, then p ∈ Pw∩α
iff p ↾ ζ ∈ Pw∩ζ and ζ < dom(p) or p(ζ) is a Pw∩ζ-name for for an object in Qα. If α is a
w-limit, then p ∈ Pw∩α iff p ↾ ζ ∈ Pw∩ζ for all ζ ∈ α ∩ w.
Of course this notion does not bring anything new: Assume β ≤ ǫ is the order type
of w, and let i : β → w be the isomorphism. Then Pw is isomorphic to the c.s.-iteration
(Rα, Qi(α))α<β.
We can calculate Pw inside M and extend our notation to that case:
Definition 4.20. Let M be a candidate, w ⊆ ǫ, w ∈ M.
• Pw is the countable support iteration along the order w.
• PMw is the forcing Pw as constructed in M.
• v covers w (with respect to M) if ǫ ⊇ v ⊇ w ∩ M.
(If w < ON, then this is independent of M, since w ⊆ M for each candidate M.)
• If v covers w, and Gv ⊆ Pv, then we define GMv→w by the following induction on
α ∈ ǫ ∩ M, provided this results in a PMw -generic filter over M. Otherwise, GMv→w
is undefined. Let p ∈ PM∩w∩α. If M thinks that w ∩ α has no last element, then
p ∈ GMv→w∩α iff p ↾ β ∈ GMv→w∩β for all β ∈ α ∩ M. If w ∩ α has the last element β,
then p ∈ GMv→w∩α iff p ↾ β ∈ GMv→w∩β and p(β)[GMv→w∩β] ∈ Gv(β).
• A Gv such that GMv→w is defined is called (M, Pw)-generic.
• Assume that Gv is (M, Pw)-generic and ζ ∈ w ∩ M. Then we set
GMv→w(ζ) = {
˜
q[GMv→w↾ζ] : ∃p p ∪ (ζ,
˜
q) ∈ GMv→w}.
• If v covers w, q ∈ Pv, and p is a PMw -condition (or p is just in M a PMw -name for a
PMw -condition), then q is (M, Pv→w, p)-generic if q forces that Gv is (M, Pw)-generic
and p ∈ GMv→w (or p[GMv→w] ∈ GMv→w, resp.).
The same proofs as 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 give us the according results for Pw:
Lemma 4.21. Assume that V ′ is an extension of V
• M and N are candidates in V, M ∈ N,
• v ∈ N and u covers v with respect to N,
• w ∈ M, M ∈ N and N thinks that M is a candidate and that v covers w with respect
to M,
• Gu ∈ V ′ is (N, Pv)-generic.
Then we get:
(1) In V, v covers w with respect to M.
(2) If ζ ∈ v ∩ N, then GNu→v(ζ) = QN[G
N
u→v ]
ζ ∩Gu(ζ).
(3) (GMu→w)V
′
= (GMv→w)N[G
N
u→v]
.
(4) In particular, G is (M, Pu→w)-generic iff N[GNu→v] thinks that GNu→v is (M, Pv→w)-
generic.
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(5) If Gu is (M, Pw)-generic and
˜
τ a PMw -name in M, then
˜
τ[GMu→w] (calculated in
V[Gu]) is the same as
˜
τ[GMv→w]M (calculated in N[GNu→v]).
(6) If q is (N, Pu→v, p)-generic and α ∈ ǫ ∩ N, then q ↾ α is (N, Pu↾α→v∩α, p ↾ α)-
generic.
Lemma 4.22. Let N ≺ H(χ), v ∈ N, (M,w) = ord-col(N, v),15 and let Gv be Pv-generic
over V. Then
(1) Gv is N-generic iff it is (M, Pv→w)-generic.
If Gv is N-generic and p,
˜
τ ∈ N, then
(2) p ∈ Gv iff ord-colN(p) ∈ GMv→w, and
(3) ord-colN[Gv ](
˜
τ[Gv]) = (ord-colN(
˜
τ))[GMv→w].
Lemma 4.23. If M is a candidate, w ∈ M, v covers w, and p ∈ PMw , then there is a
(M, Pv→w, p)-generic q ∈ Pv.
We give the following Lemma (used for Q =Mathias in [SS07]) as an example for how
we can use this iteration:
Lemma 4.24. Let ¯B = (Bi)i∈I be a sequence (in V) of Borel codes. Let Qα = Q be the
same nep forcing (definition) for all α < ǫ. If Pω1 forces
⋂
¯B = ∅, then Pǫ forces⋂ ¯B = ∅.
Proof. We assume that ⋂ ¯B = ∅ is forced by Pω1 and therefore by all Pα for α ∈ ω1. We
additionally assume towards a contradiction that
(4.1) p0 ǫ
˜
η0 ∈
⋂
Bi.
We fix a “countable version” of the name
˜
η0: Let N0 ≺ H(χ) contain
˜
η0 and p0. Let
(M0,
˜
η′0, p
′
0) be the ord-collapse of (N0,
˜
η0, p0). Set w = ǫ ∩ N0 = ǫ ∩ M0. In particular, w
is countable.
Since w covers ǫ with respect to M0, we can find an (M0, Pw→ǫ , p′0)-generic condition
q0 in Pw. Under q0 we can define the Pw-name
(4.2)
˜
τ ≔
˜
η′0[GM0w→ǫ].
So whenever q is in a Gw-generic filter, then
˜
τ[Gw] is the same as
˜
η′0[GM0w→ǫ].
Pw is isomorphic to Pα for some countable α, so we know that Pw forces
˜
τ <
⋂
¯B. In
particular, we can find a q˜ ≤ q0 and an i0 ∈ I such that
(4.3) q˜ 
˜
τ < Bi0 .
Let N1 ≺ H(χ) contain the previously mentioned objects. In particular w ⊂ N1. Let
(M1, P′, q˜′) be the ord-collapses of (N1, Pw, q˜). By elementarity, P′ = PM1w . Since ǫ covers
w, we can find an (M1, Pǫ→w, q′0)-generic condition q1 in Pǫ .
Let G be a Pǫ -generic filter over V containing q1. Set r =
˜
η0[G]. So r ∈
⋂
¯B by (4.1).
On the other hand, r˜ ≔
˜
τ′[ ˜G] is not in Bi0 for ˜G ≔ GM1ǫ→w. Also, r˜ =
˜
η′0[ ˜GM0w→ǫ]. It remains
to show that r = r˜. This follows from transitivity (see Lemma 4.21), i.e., ˜GM0w→ǫ = GM0ǫ→ǫ ,
and the fact that GM0ǫ→ǫ = GM0ǫ , and from elementarity (see Lemma 4.7), i.e., (M0[GM0ǫ ], M0)
is the ord-collapse of (N0[G], N0). 
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